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I. INTRODUCTION

Unless the separate legal personality of the corporation is disregarded under
a veil-piercing theory, corporate shareholders, as such, are not personally liable
for the debts of their corporation.' But the fact that these persons bear no
personal liability in their capacity as shareholders does not mean that they are
immune from liability under other generally applicable principles of law. When
a shareholder personally commits a tort 2 or personally becomes a party to a
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1. La. R.S. 12:93(B) (1969); Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1167-69 (La.
1991), reh'g denied, 592 So. 2d 1282 (1992). See generally Glenn G. Morris, Piercing the
Corporate Veil in Louisiana, 52 La. L. Rev. 271 (1991).
2. Corporate officers and agents have been held personally liable for:
1) Their personal fraud: Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. American Chem., Inc., 461 So. 2d
1063 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 480 So. 2d 730 (1986); Dolese Concrete Co. v.
Tessitore, 357 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 359 So. 2d 620, 623 (1978);
2) Their personal negligence resulting in personal injury: Canter v. Koehring Co., 283
So. 2d 716 (La. 1973);
3) Their personal negligence resulting in accidental physical damage to corporeal
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contract, 3 that shareholder becomes personally liable for the resulting obligation,
not because the corporation has incurred an obligation for which he is liable, but
because he personally did the things necessary to be treated as a tortfeasor or
contracting party in his own right. If the corporation bears liability in connection
with the same event or transaction, the separate personality of the corporation
will still shield the shareholder from personal liability for the resulting corporate
debt, but it will not protect the shareholder from his personal responsibility for
his own contract or tort.
This type of personal-conduct-based liability can be particularly important
in a small business setting, where most shareholders are actively and personally
involved in the day-to-day operation of the firm. Indeed, the owners of small
business corporations are much more likely to be held personally liable for their
own personal conduct under non-corporate principles of law than they are to be
subjected to for the liabilities of the corporation itself under a corporate law veilpiercing theory. This article provides an introduction to these other, largelyoverlooked theories, and discusses their implications in practice.4
II. CONTRACT LIABILITY GENERALLY

Shareholders, as such, are protected against personal liability for corporate
debts by the separate legal personality of the corporation 5 and by the related

property: United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.Ledford, 244 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writ denied, 246 So. 2d 681 (1971). Accord H.B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard,
318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975) (indicating that such liability was possible, but finding it not to
exist in the instant case).
3. The two most common means by which corporate shareholders become parties to corporate
contracts are by personal guarantees, usually deliberate but sometimes inadvertent, and by their acts
as corporate agents without adequate disclosure concerning their agency. See La. Civ. Code arts.
3012, 3013 (agents not liable for principals' contracts unless they personally guarantee them); La.
Civ. Code arts. 3035-3062 (governing contracts of suretyship generally); Homer Nat'l Bank v.
Springlake Farms, Inc., 616 So. 2d 255 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) (liability on disputed personal
guarantee); C. T. Traina Plumbing & Heating Contractors, Inc. v. Palmer, 580 So. 2d 525 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 1166 (1991) (liability as undisclosed agent). However, any act or
statement that might reasonably be construed as a corporate shareholder's consent to a personal
contract could be enough to bind him to such a contract under ordinary principles of objective
contract interpretation. La. Civ. Code arts. 1927, 2045 and comment b to Article 2045. Cf.Weeden
Eng'g Corp. v. Hale, 435 So. 2d 1158 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 441 So. 2d 764 (1983) (lawyer
who wrote an expert witness, in his capacity as agent for client, but saying, "I wish to employ you"
was held personally liable to the witness for the payment of the witness' fee); Castille v. Folck, 338
So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (horse auctioneer held personally liable on implied personal
-assurances to bidding audience that horses being sold had been tested for certain diseases).
4. The discussion in this article is limited to claims by third parties under general theories of
private law. No effort is made to discuss the fiduciary or other duties owed within the corporation
or to cover particular statutory provisions that may impose personal liability, either civil or criminal,
on corporate officers or directors in connection with various types of regulation or taxation.
5. Riggins, 590 So._2d at 1167-69.
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statutory rule that shareholders are not liable for corporate debts.6 Other
corporate participants, such as officers and employees, also enjoy protection from
contractual liability, but the source of their protection is mainly agency, not
corporation, law. 7 In fact, corporation law has only limited relevance in this
area. Corporation law does provide that a fictional person, separate from the
shareholders, is the principal in so-called "corporate" transactions,8 but the
existence of this kind of separate fictional person is neither necessary nor
sufficient to protect an agent from personal liability for the transactions that he
undertakes for his principal. Any agent can avoid personal liability for his
principal's contracts, regardless of whether the purported principal on the
contracts happens to be a corporation or a human being,9 and, conversely, a
corporation's separate fictional personality can be fully respected without
necessarily protecting the corporation's agents from personal liability. 0

6. La. R.S. 12:93(B) (1969).
7. The corporation statute does not mention officers or directors in its description of the
persons who are to be free from personal liability for the debts of the business. The pertinent
provision refers strictly to shareholders. See id. Persons who do not hold any such ownership-like
position but who act strictly as disclosed agents of the corporation do not need the protections of
corporation law. Agency law already protects them from personal liability for the authorized
contracts they enter into as agents in the name of another person. La. Civ. Code arts. 2985, 3012,
3013. Even if these agents were acting for an unincorporated business association, e.g., a
proprietorship or partnership, they would still bear no personal liability for the authorized contracts
they had executed as disclosed agents. Only the principal-the proprietorship or partnership-would
be bound.
8. Riggins, 590 So. 2d at 1167.
9. Most of the modem cases dealing with agents involve agents of corporations. See, e.g.,
Bergman v. Nicholson Management & Consultants, Inc., 594 So. 2d 491 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 600 So. 2d 646 (1992); Voiter v. Antique Art Gallery, 524 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 531 So. 2d 271 (1988); Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
Business is so frequently conducted through corporations today that it is difficult to find modem
cases that apply the nonliability rule outside of the corporate setting. Nevertheless, the Louisiana
Civil Code rule concerning the nonliability of disclosed agents is stated in general terms, without
even mentioning corporations. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3012, 3013. Cf 2 Marcel Planiol, Trait
Elementaire De Droit Civil
2240 (Louisiana State Law Institute trans., 1959) (1939) ("the
mandatary does not obligate himself by the acts which he accomplishes in the name of his
principal"). The silence in agency law on the subject of corporations is understandable, for the
agency rules originated in Roman law, see Planiol, supra, 2231, many centuries before the birth
of the modern business corporation. Corporation law did not create the concept of nonliability for
business representatives; it took advantage of the principles that already existed in agency law.
Before corporations became dominant in business, the same agency principles were applied routinely
in dealing with agents of individuals and partnerships. See, e.g.. Rosenthal v. Myers, 25 La. Ann.
463 (1873); Gilman v. Bonner & Smith, 7 La. Ann. 674 (1852); Lincoln v. Smith, 11 La. 11 (1837).
Today, the typical setting for an agency dispute has indeed changed, but the same principles of
nonliability still apply, whether or not the principal happens to be incorporated.
10. See, e.g., C. T. Traina Plumbing & Heating Contractors, Inc. v. Palmer, 580 So. 2d 525 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 1166 (1991) (liable as undisclosed agent of corporation); Lone
Star Indus., Inc. v. American Chem., Inc., 461 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 480 So.
2d 730 (1986) (liable for personal fraud in connection with corporate business); Cooley v. Al Hirt
Enters., Inc., 180 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965) (agent of corporatiofi, could be held personally
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The importance of agency law principles cannot be overstated in the small
business setting, for the small business owner will rarely face personal liability
in his capacity as shareholder. Rather, as a result of participating in the actual
operations of the corporation, the owner of the business will face exposure to
contractual liability almost entirely in connection with his activities as agent. As
an agent, the business owner or participant can become personally liable for the
contracts of his principal in three different ways: by guaranteeing the contracts
personally, by exceeding his authority, and by failing to satisfy his disclosure
duties.
III. EFFECTS OF SHAREHOLDER GUARANTEES
The general law of guarantees and suretyship are beyond the scope of this
article." However, it is clear that a personal guarantee will make the guarantor
personally liable for the guaranteed obligation, even if the guarantor would
otherwise be free of liability as an agent or shareholder. 2
Shareholder guarantees of corporate indebtedness are undoubtedly the most
common source of personal liability on corporate indebtedness. These guarantees
are almost always required in major transactions between sophisticated creditors
and closely-held corporations. In effect, major shareholders routinely waive the
limited liability that corporation law theoretically provides to them in the very
transactions in which the limitation might otherwise be considered most
important. As a practical matter, shareholders will typically enjoy limited
liability for corporate obligations only in connection with debts that are not
normally associated with personal guarantees, such as tort claims, employee
salary obligations, and smaller, routine trade accounts. These limited protections
can still be important, of course, for a company's tort exposure can potentially
be very great and its numerous small accounts can add up to a large total figure.
Nevertheless, a closely-held corporation is normally not a device that allows
shareholders to engage in a business free from any personal responsibilities for
the obligations that the business generates. Through guarantees, shareholders
will usually end up bearing personal liability for much, if not most, of the
corporation's total indebtedness.
The personal exposure created by shareholder guarantees has important
effects on the management of the debtor corporation. Indeed, shareholder
guarantees are not demanded by creditors merely as backups to the creditworthiness of the debtor corporations. Guarantees are routinely demanded evef when
the shareholder's additional assets are so meager that they are going to make

liable to third party for exceeding his authority).
11. See generally La. Civ. Code arts. 3035-3070 (provisions on suretyship); La. R.S. 10:3-419
(1993) (effective Jan. 1, 1994) (treatment of accommodation parties on negotiable instruments as
sureties; applicability of the Civil Code suretyship articles).
12. La. Civ. Code arts. 3012 (agent liable if he personally guarantees); 3035 (definition of
surety); 3045 (liability of surety).
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little difference in the lender's collection efforts if the debtor corporation defaults
on the loan. 3 In this type of case, which is common in small business lending,
the real point of the shareholder guarantee is not to reach some financially
insignificant personal assets of the shareholder after default, but to encourage the
shareholders to do their very best to avoid default in the first place.
Shareholder guarantees reduce or eliminate the incentives that the shareholders might otherwise have to pay themselves handsome salaries in preference to
repaying the lender, or to take attractive new business opportunities for
themselves personally, leaving behind a financially-troubled corporate borrower. "' Creditors who hold shareholder guarantees do not have to stand by and
watch the assets of their corporate borrower disappear until, too late to do much
good, they finally gain the right as a result of their debtor's insolvency to try to
engage in the expensive and typically fruitless effort to rescind their debtor's
various asset transfers. 5 Instead, these creditors can be confident that the
shareholder-guarantors will treat the guaranteed corporate debts as if they were
the debts of the shareholders themselves, and so will do their best to see that
those debts are paid.
In general, the incentives created by loan guarantees work to the benefit of
all creditors, and not merely the creditors who hold the guarantees. The
shareholder-guarantors will understand that the loan on which they are personally
obligated will be repaid by the principal debtor, the corporation, only if the
corporation stays in business long enough to generate the necessary funds. They
will also understand that the corporation will stay in business only if it pays its
day-to-day bills and expenses. 16 Under normal circumstances, therefore, the
shareholders' best course of action is to manage the company well enough to pay
all of its bills, guaranteed and unguaranteed alike.

13. The shareholder issuing the guarantee often has personal assets that are insignificant in
relation to the size of the indebtedness. See Scott C. Barney, Comment, Bankruptcy Preferences and
Insider Guarantees, 51 La. L. Rev. 1047, 1061-63 (1991) (citing Isaac Nutovic, The Bankruptcy
Preference Laws: Interpreting Code Sections 547(c)(2), 550(c)(I), and 546(a)(1), 41 Bus. Law. 175,
196 (1985)).
14. Barney, supra note 13, at 1063-64.
15. Only shareholders have standing to bring derivative actions to enforce the fiduciary duties
that are owed by officers and directors to the corporation. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 591, 596; McCall
v. McCall Enters., Inc., 578 So. 2d 260 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 581 So. 2d 708 (1991). For
a creditor to challenge corporate management, he has to show-that grounds exist, based on some form
of insolvency or financial embarrassment, to replace corporate management with a bankruptcy trustee
or with a receiver or liquidator, or to file revocatory or oblique actions under the terms of the Civil
Code. See II U.S.C.A. § 303 (1993) (grounds for relief in involuntary bankruptcy); La. R.S. 12:143
(1969) (involuntary liquidation); La. R.S. 12:151 (1969) (appointment of receiver); La. Civ. Code
arts. 2036, 2044 (revocatory and oblique actions). Otherwise, the creditor must negotiate complicated
loan covenants, and then monitor the debtor's compliance with the covenants, in the hopes that the
lender's power to declare an event of default on the corporate loan will adequately deter adverse
behavior by those in control of the borrowing corporation. Personal guarantees are much simpler.
They work automatically and are far more difficult to circumvent.
16. See Barney, supra note 13, at 1065.
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However, once it becomes obvious to the shareholder-guarantors that the

corporation is approaching insolvency, the incentives change. The shareholders
will now wish to cause the corporation to reduce or cut off its payments to
nonessential, non-guaranteed creditors and to generate and spend as much cash
as possible in repaying the guaranteed creditors. This type of behavior will
reduce the shareholders' own exposure on the guaranteed debts at the expense
of those creditors who hold no such guarantees, and will allow the shareholders
to shift some of the costs of the business
failure from themselves to the
7
corporation's non-guaranteed creditors.
These insolvency-related incentives have produced a debate among courts
and commentators concerning the proper treatment of guaranteed debts under
bankruptcy law.' Beginning with a 1989 decision by the Seventh Circuit,' 9
several courts have treated certain payments on shareholder-guaranteed corporate
debts as rescindable insider preferences under bankruptcy law. 20 This approach
has been strongly criticized on policy grounds by several courts and commentators. 2' However, as a matter of Louisiana law, the question appears to be moot,
as the comments to the 1984 revision of the obligations articles of the Civil Code
indicate that issues of preferential payments are to be governed by federal
bankruptcy law, and not by Louisiana law.22

17. See Nutovic, supra note 13, at 195-96 (insider guarantees sought by lenders to enable them
to exert pressure for preferred treatment). But see David I Katzen, Deprizio and Bankruptcy Section
550: Extended Preference Exposure Via Insider Guarantees,and Other Perilsof Initial Transfer
Liability, 45 Bus. Law. 511, 520 (1990) (preferential treatment of payments on insider-guaranteed
debts will only matter if the guarantor is unable to pay; typically if this type of debt is not repaid by
the principal debtor, the guarantor will also be unable to pay, so indifferent to whether guaranteed
or non-guaranteed creditor is paid); Barney, supra note 13, at 1065-66 (preference treatment of
payments on insider-guaranteed debts will encourage use of alternative security arrangements for
powerful creditors, and these arrangements will not produce the incidental benefits for other creditors
that guarantees provide)..,
18. Compare In re Robinson Bros. Drilling, Inc., 97 B.R. 77 (Bankr. W. D. Okla. 1988), affd,
892 F.2d 850 (10th Cir. 1989) andIn re C-L Cartage Co., 899 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1990) and Levitt
v. Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp., 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989) (treating certain payments on
shareholder-guaranteed debts as insider preferences, subject to rescission; known generally as the
Depriziorule) with In re Arundell Hous. Components, Inc., 126 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991) and
In the Matter of the Midwestern Cos., 102 B.R. 169 (Bankr. W. D. Mo. 1989) (rejecting the Deprizio
rule). For citations to disagreements among commentators, see Barney, supranote 13, at 1050 n.21.
See also Heuk J. Brands, The Interplay Between Sections 547(b) and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code,
89 Colum. L. Rev. 530, 542-46 (1989); Jay L. Westbrook, Two Thoughts About InsiderPreferences,
76 Minn. L. Rev. 73, 80-86 (1991).
19. Levitt, 874 F.2d 1186.
20. In re Robinson Bros. Drilling,97 B.R. 77; In re C-L CartageCo., 899 F.2d 1490. See Erin
Food Servs., Inc. v. Cambridge Meridian Group, Inc., 980 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1992) (assuming,
without deciding, that the Deprizio rule was correct).
21. In re Arundell Hous. Components, Inc., 126 B.R. 216 (Bankr. D. Md. 1991); Westbrook,
supra note 18, at 80-86; Brands, supra note 18, at 542-46; Katzen, supra note 17, at 520; Barney,
supra note 13.
22. La. Civ. Code art. 2036, cmt. (g). But see Amp Serv. Corp. v. Richard, 419 So. 2d 911
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The personal liability created by a guarantee seldom surprises the guarantor.
However, it should be noted that the law recognizes the possibility of an implied,
even inadvertent personal contract or, in the language of the jurisprudence, a
"pledging of personal responsibility."23 Depending on the nature of the
obligation incurred, the debt might be in the nature of suretyship (if it was
conditioned on the principal debtor's failure to pay 24), or it might simply be
construed as a direct personal obligation on the part of the agent. The point is
that corporate shareholders should be careful in their dealings with third parties
not to speak or write as if they were personally undertaking the responsibility to
pay a corporate debt or to perform some other corporate obligation. This type
of language sometimes can be interpreted as an undertaking of personal
contractual liability by the agent.25
IV. UNDISCLOSED AGENCY

Next to a personal guarantee, the most common agency law basis for
imposing contractual liability on a corporate participant is the failure of the
participant, while acting as an agent for the corporation, to provide adequate
disclosure of his agency. Louisiana law, like the common law,26 holds an
undisclosed agent personally liable for the contracts that he negotiates on his
principal's behalf.27 Undisclosed agency liability is particularly troublesome in
a small business setting because it is fairly common for shareholders to act in
representative capacities, for example, as officers, agents, or employees, on

(La. 1982) (prior to revision of obligations articles in 1984; preferential transfer of security interest
to shareholders/creditors to the prejudice of arms' length unsecured creditors was subject to attack
as an unlawful preference).
23. See Weeden Eng'g Corp. v. Hale, 435 So. 2d 1158 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 441 So.
2d 764 (1983); Castille v. Folck, 338 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
24. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3035, 3037 and comment a to Article .3037.
25. See Weeden Eng'g Corp. v. Hale, 435 So. 2d 1158 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 441 So.
2d 764 (1983) (lawyer who wrote an expert witness, in his capacity as agent for client, but saying,
"I wish to employ you," was held personally liable to the witness for the payment of the witness'
fee); Castille v. Folck, 338 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976) (horse auctioneer held personally
liable on implied personal assurances to bidding audience that horses being sold had been tested for
certain diseases).
26. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 322 (1958); Harold G. Reuschlein & William A.
Gregory, The Law of Agency and Partnership (2d ed. 1990).
27. E.g., Chappuis & Chappuis v. Kaplan, 170 La. 763, 129 So. 156 (1930); Dash Bldg.
Materials Ctr., Inc. v. Henning, 560 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); G.T.M. Carpet Co. v.
Richards, 534 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Travis v. Hudnall, 517 So. 2d 1085 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1987); Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Double H Constr. Co., 459 So. 2d 1273 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1984). Until recently, some question existed as to whether Louisiana law recognized
one important feature of the common law of undisclosed agency, namely, the power of an
undisclosed agent to create a contract enforceable by his undisclosed principal against the third party.
That question has now been answered; Louisiana does recognize this power. Woodlawn Park Ltd.
Partnership v. Doster Constr. Co., 623 So. 2d 645 (La. 1993).
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behalf of their closely-held corporations without formally disclosing to the third
party the capacity in which they are acting.
Undisclosed agency theory, properly understood, 28 poses risks of liability
only for those shareholders who involve themselves personally in negotiating
contracts on behalf of their corporation, and only with respect to those particular
transactions in which disclosure or notice about the agency has been inadequate.
Purely passive shareholders, those who limit their involvement in corporate
operations to voting at shareholder meetings, do not face risks of undisclosed
agency liability, and those active shareholders or employees who do bear
undisclosed agency liability bear that liability only for the particular transactions
affected.
Undisclosed agency theory is simple and appealing: an agent who negotiates
a contract in his own name does not appear to the other party to the contract to
be an agent at all. He seems to be negotiating for himself as a principal. The
law merely treats the agent as what he objectively seems to be, a contracting
party in his own right.29 The agent is liable as a party to the contract for the
simple reason that he appeared to be a party at the time of contracting.30 The
third party is allowed to enforce his contract against the person with whom he

28. Some Louisiana cases have confused undisclosed agency with undisclosed corporate
capacity. Some undisclosed corporate capacity cases have imposed liability on shareholders for
transactions that the shareholders did not themselves negotiate. See infra text accompanying notes
54-63.
29. See, e.g., Chappuis & Chappuis v. Kaplan, 170 La. 763, 129 So. 156 (1930); C. T. Traina
Plumbing & Heating Contractors, Inc. v. Palmer, 580 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,
584 So. 2d 1166 (1991); Black Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. Koehl & Assocs., Inc., 571 So. 2d 902 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 12 (1991); Marmedic, Inc. v. International Ship
Management & Agency Servs., Inc., 425 So. 2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Chartes Corp. v.
Twilbeck, 305 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Pat's Furniture Showrooms, Inc. v. Furniture
Warehouse of Houma, Inc., 392 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), writ not considered, 397 So.
2d 803 (1981); Melancon v. Keller, 136 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
30. Note that we are not talking about apparent authority here. The question in an apparent
authority case is not whether the third party understood that he was dealing with an agent, but
whether the purported agent appeared to have the necessary authorization from the principal. See
Hight Enters., Inc. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping), Inc., 421 So. 2d 267 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982),
writ denied, 427 So. 2d 1206 (1983) (distinguishing apparent authority from undisclosed agency).
In an apparent authority case, where the legal rules also happen to be based on objective contract
theory, the principal (as distinguished from the agent) may be bound to the third party if, by his
conduct or statements, he has caused the third partyreasonably to believe that the agent had the
authority that he purported to have. See, e.g., Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960 (La.
1989); Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d 1 (La. 1987); Interstate Elec. Co. v. Frank Adam Elec. Co.,
173 La. 103, 136 So. 283 (1931); Hawthorne v. Kinder Corp., 513 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1987); AAA Tire & Export, Inc. v. Big Chief Truck Lines, Inc., 385 So. 2d 426 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1980). Whether an undisclosed agent acted within his authority is important in deciding whether the
principal is bound by the actions of the agent, but authority is irrelevant to the liability of the agent
himself. If the agent acts with authority on behalf of his principal, then his actions bind both him
and the principal, but if the actions are unauthorized, they should bind him alone.

19931

PERSONAL LIABILITY WITHOUT VEIL-PIERCING

reasonably thought he was contracting, even if that person was secretly acting as
an agent for someone else.3
"Undisclosed" agency is actually something of a misnomer, for while
express disclosure is certainly sufficient to preclude this sort of liability, actual
disclosure either by the agent or by the principal is not strictly necessary. If,
under the circumstances, a third party already knows or should know what
disclosure would reveal,32 then actual, express disclosure is not required.33
Still, for the agent, express disclosure is normally the best policy." The agent
bears the burden of proof on the disclosure issue and the reported cases suggest
that circumstantial notice is difficult to prove. 5 When agent defendants are
forced to fall back on the argument, "I didn't tell him but he must have known,"

31. The contract may also be enforced by the third party against the undisclosed principal.
Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Double H Constr. Co., 459 So. 2d 1273 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1984). However, there seems to be some disagreement concerning the nature of the liability owed
by the principal and the agent to the third party. Older cases, following the much-criticized
traditional common law theory, say that the third party, once he knows about the principal, must
make an election concerning which of the two parties he wishes to hold liable; he may not obtain
a judgment against both. Later cases, better reasoned on this point, hold that the liability owed is
solidary in nature. Compare Restatement (Second) of Agency § 186, cmt. a and § 210, cmts. a, b
(1958) (common law rule and criticisms) and LaBella Insulation, Inc. v. Connolly, 182 So. 2d 117
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Dumaine & Co. v. Gay, Sullivan & Co., 192 So. 117 (La. App. Orleans
1939). order set aside on other grounds, 194 La. 777, 194 So. 779 (1940) (election required); Dart
v. Kinchen, 176 So. 2d 638 (La. App. Ist Cir.), writ denied, 248 La. 386, 178 So. 2d 664 (1965)
(judgment may be obtained against "either" the principal or agent; citing a Florida case as if it were
a Louisiana case) with Travis v. Hudnall, 517 So. 2d 1085 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Frank's Door,
459 So. 2d 1273 (solidary liability).
32. Say, for example, that a uniformed repair person for a well-known retail store, driving a
truck painted with the store's color scheme and trademarks, arrives at a local parts supply house, and
'then orders repair parts from the supplier without saying explicitly that he is placing the order as
agent for his employer. It seems unlikely that the repair person would be held personally liable on
the order, even though nothing has been said explicitly about his role as agent. Both his agency
status and the identity of his principal seem rather obvious under the circumstances.
33. E.g., G.T.M. Carpet Co. v. Richards, 534 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Pesson v
Kleckley, 526 So. 2d 1220 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); American Plumbing Co. v. Hadwin, 483 So. 2d
169 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 486 So. 2d 756 (1986); Mike's Serv. Station Supply, Inc. v.
Thiele, 391 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So. 2d 931 (1981); J.T. Doiron,
Inc. v. Lundin, 385 So. 2d 450 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Eastin v. Ramey, 257 So. 2d 717 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1972).
34. J.T. Doiron, 385 So. 2d at 452-53 ("Certainly, actual written or verbal communication by
the agent to the party with whom he is dealing is the best method to disclose the agent's status. The
agent who reveals his status and his principal's identity in such a way has performed the affirmative
duty placed on him by the law and has removed the presumption that he acted in his individual
capacity.").
35. E.g., C. T. Traina Plumbing & Heating Contractors, Inc. v. Palmer, 580 So. 2d 525 (La.
App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 1166 (1991); Black Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. Koehl &
Assocs., Inc., 571 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 12 (1991); G.T.M.
Carpet Co., 534 So. 2d 539; Pat's Furniture Showrooms, Inc. v. Furniture Warehouse of Houma, Inc.,
392 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), writ not considered, 397 So. 2d 803 (1981); J.T.Doiron,
385 So. 2d 450.
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their positions appear weak. Sometimes they win,36 but more frequently they
lose.37
Despite the greater attention normally devoted to corporate veil-piercing, 8
undisclosed agency theory usually poses the greater danger to the limited liability
of a small business owner. Veil-piercing is considered extraordinary, and, in
theory at least, is based on informality so severe that the corporation can be said
to have become "indistinguishable" from the shareholders.39 In contrast,
undisclosed agency liability may arise from simple informality in a single
transaction.
Undisclosed agency theory is so simple, so appealing, and so susceptible to
reversal-resistant factual findings and burden-of-proof determinations by trial
courts that it offers these courts a much more dependable means of imposing
personal liability than does veil-piercing theory. The creditor in an undisclosed
agency case need not prove that the debtor corporation has been so badly
managed that its very existence ought to be disregarded; the existence of the
corporation may be freely conceded. All the creditor needs to do to recover
personally from the defendant is to convince the court that the defendant failed
to carry his burden of proving adequate disclosure or notice of either the agency
1

36. J.T. Doiron, 385 So. 2d 450. Cf American Plumbing, 483 So. 2d 169 (where conflicting
evidence existed concerning pre-contract disclosure, but where plaintiff admitted defendant's express
disclosure of agency and identity of principal no later than two or three hours after minor work on
contract had commenced, and where bills were sent to and paid by corporation, it was manifestly
erroneous to impose personal liability on defendant under undisclosed agency theory); Bush v.
Saucier, 197 So. 2d 907 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967) (circumstances corroborated agent's claim that he
provided express, though verbal, disclosure of his agency status). Accord Port Ship Serv., Inc. v.
Norton, Lilly & Co., 883 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 962, 110 S. Ct. 2575 (1990).
Port Ship did not purport to construe Louisiana law, but instead followed an earlier decision, Port
Ship Serv., Inc. v. International Ship Management & Agencies Serv., Inc., 800 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir.
1986), which had applied general common law principles of agency in a dispute arising out of service
contracts entered into by a maritime agent in the name of specified vessels (whose owners were not
identified) anchored near New Orleans. Port Ship (1986) held that disclosure of agency status and
identifying the vessel was sufficient notice to apprise the third party that his contract was with the
owner of the vessel rather than with the agent personally. Port Ship (1986) was really a case of
partial disclosure rather than complete nondisclosure. However, a Louisiana court that considered
asimilar relationship between a third party and a marine service company that was purporting to act
as agent for an identified vessel's owner, affirmed atrial court determination that the purported agent
was an independent contractor, not an agent, and held that, even if he was an agent, disclosure had
been inadequate. Marmedic, Inc. v. International Ship Management & Agency Servs., Inc., 425 So.
2d 878 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
37. -See,e.g., G.T.M. Carpet Co., 534 So. 2d 539; Pesson, 526 So. 2d 1220; Andrus v. Bourque,
442 So. 2d 1383 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); Duckworth-Woods Tire Serv., Inc. v. Smith & Johnson
(Shipping), Inc., 430 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Thiele, 391 So. 2d 560; Regency Elec.,
Inc. v. Verges, 360 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir, 1978); Chartes Corp. v. Twilbeck, 305 So. 2d 730
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Eastin, 257 So. 2d 717; Williams v. O'Bryan, 257 So. 2d 174 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1972).
38. See generally Morris, supra note 1.
39. See id.

1993]

PERSONAL LIABILITY WITHOUT VEIL-PIERCING

itself or the identity of the principal. Creditors seem to enjoy far greater success
with this theory than with the veil-piercing theory.
To avoid undisclosed agency, active shareholders should be careful to
respect corporate fictions at least to the extent that they sign all contracts in the
corporation's name, and that they make sure that all business signs, cards,
stationery and forms include an appropriate designation of corporate status.
Ideally, the shareholders of a small business corporation should avoid thinking
or speaking of themselves as the direct, personal owners of their business. They
should be conscious that it is their agency status, and not merely the incorporation of their business that protects them from personal liability.
A. Timing of Disclosure
An undisclosed agent is held liable as a party to the contracts that he
negotiates for the simple reason that he appears to be a party when the contract
is made. It follows that if this status as an apparent party is to be avoided
through disclosure, the disclosure must occur (or the third party must have
adequate notice in some other way) no later than contemporaneously with the
creation of the contract.4
Several cases go so far as to say that disclosure must occur "before" the
contract is entered into,4' but these statements appear to be nothing more than
inartful expressions of the true rule that disclosure must occur no later than the
time of contracting. The real point of the timing rule is not that disclosure
should occur twice, once before signing and once again as part of the signature
itself, but simply that the required disclosures (or other indications of agency)
cannot relieve the agent of liability if they come sometime after the contract is
entered into. Once the agent has become a party, he cannot undo his status
simply by explaining, after-the-fact, that he really was acting only as an agent.42
Disclosure occurs in most written contracts simply by means of a signature
block in proper form, such as this:

40. Melancon v. Keller, 136 So. 2d 67, 69 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962) (requiring disclosure "at
the time of making the contract"); Tri-State Oil Tool Co. of S. La. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 135
So. 2d 297 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) ("... unless notice of the fact of agency and the name of the
principal is given at the time of the contract it will not be sufficient disclosure to avoid liability").
41. Travis v. Hudnall, 517 So. 2d 1085 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987); Centanni v. A.K. Roy, Inc.,
258 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); McKay v. Vesley, 163 So. 2d 121 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
42. See Centanni, 258 So. 2d 219 (disclosure of identity of client one day after contract signed
was insufficient to relieve real estate agent of personal liability as undisclosed agent); Williams v.
O'Bryan, 257 So. 2d 174 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972) (imposing undisclosed agency liability where
disclosure occurred after indebtedness was incurred); Tri-State Oil Tool Co., 135 So. 2d 297 (notice
to contractor in the middle of performance of contracted work that dispute existed between previously
undisclosed agent and agent's purported principal about which of the two was supposed to pay for
the work was ineffective to relieve the previously undisclosed agent of personal liability for the full
contract price, even though the contractor had finished the job after learning about the dispute).
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ABC, INC.
By: /s/Joan Smith,
Agent [or "President" or other similar designation]
This form of disclosure is sufficient to preclude undisclosed agency liability on
the part of the agent.4 3 As long as the contract itself clearly denotes that one
or both of the signing parties signed as agents for their identified principals, then
adequate and timely disclosure has occurred for the properly-signing agent(s).
One last distinction needs to be drawn concerning the timing of disclosure:
while post-contract disclosure is ineffective, post-contract indications of agency
status might still be relevant as evidence in resolving a factual dispute whether
disclosure really did occur by the time the contract was made. If the postcontract factors suggest only after-the-fact efforts by the agent to withdraw from
liability, then they are legally ineffective. However, if the plaintiff has
corresponded with the corporate principal after the contract was executed, or has
sent bills to and has been paid strictly by the principal, then these post-contract
actions should be viewed as some evidence (though certainly not conclusive) that
the plaintiff really did understand at the time of contractingthat he was dealing
If, on balance, this evidence
with the principal rather than the agent."
outweighs contrary evidence of a lack of disclosure or knowledge, then the agent
should not be held liable under an undisclosed agency theory.45

43. See, e.g., Meisel v. Natal Homes, Inc. 447 So. 2d 511 (La. App, 4th Cir. 1984) (signature
on contract as corporate vice president was express disclosure of agency; signature alone was
sufficient disclosure, although there were other, corroborating indications of agency status); Donnelly
v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478 (La. App. IstCir. 1982) (signature on contract "as president,"
distinguished from signature in personal capacity, held to be sufficient to preclude personal liability
for breach of contract terms not agreed to by means of the personal signature).
44. See Meisel, 447 So. 2d 511. Cf American Plumbing Co. v. Hadwin, 483 So. 2d 169 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 486 So. 2d 756 (1986) (where conflicting evidence existed concerning
pre-contract disclosure, but where plaintiff admitted defendant's express disclosure no later than two
or three hours after minor work on contract had begun, and where bills were sent to and paid by
corporate principal, it was manifestly erroneous to impose personal liability on defendant under
undisclosed agency theory).
45. However, one of the more common forms of post-contract evidence, i.e., payments by
corporate checks, has seemed in most cases not to be very persuasive on the pre-contract disclosure
issue; defendants have frequently lost with that sort of evidence. See, e.g., C.T. Traina Plumbing &
Heating Contractors, Inc. v. Palmer, 580 So. 2d 525 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 584 So. 2d 1166
(1991); Dash Bldg. Materials Ctr., Inc. v. Henning, 560 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990); G.T.M.
Carpet Co. v. Richards, 534 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Pesson v. Kleckley, 526 So. 2d
1220 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988); Frank's Door & Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. Double H Constr. Co., 459 So.
2d 1273 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Darr v. Kinchen, 176 So. 2d 638 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
248 La. 386, 178 So. 2d 664 (1965); Wilson v. McNabb, 157 So. 2d 897 (La. App. IstCir. 1963);
Three Rivers Hardwood Lumber Co.v. Gibson, 181 So. 607 (La. App.2d Cir. 1938).
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B. PartialDisclosure, Disclosure of CorporateStatus
Many of the cases that are decided on undisclosed agency grounds in
Louisiana are mislabeled. They do not involve a complete nondisclosure of
agency in which the third party is led reasonably to believe that the "agent" is
acting for himself individually as a principal. Rather, in these cases, the agent
discloses his agency status, and usually some information concerning the identity
of his principal, but not enough information to allow the third party to identify
the principal with adequate precision. 6 In the common law, this incomplete
form of disclosure is known as "partial disclosure," and it is distinguished from
the total nondisclosure that exists in the true "undisclosed agency" cases.
Partial disclosure and nondisclosure theories are similar in the common law
in the sense that each ultimately relies on an objective interpretation of the
parties' contract as the correct means of resolving questions concerning the
identities of the parties to be bound. In many cases, regardless of which theory
is chosen, the outcome is the same: the agent is held personally liable. But
there remains an important difference between the two theories. In complete
nondisclosure cases, where the third party does not know even that the agent is
an agent, the only plausible interpretation of the contract is that the agent was
perceived by the third party as binding himself personally to the agreement. In
the case of partial disclosure, where the agent purports to be an agent for
someone, however poorly identified, the same may not be true. The agent is
normally considered liable, but the parties may agree to the contrary. Whether
an agreement to the contrary has been reached is simply a question of contract
interpretation.
Thus, when an agent tells the third party only that he is an agent, without
providing even the slightest information concerning the identity of his principal,
the agent is almost always considered personally liable on the contract.47 This
liability is not imposed as some form of punishment for the agent's failure to
disclose; it merely represents the most plausible interpretation of the parties'
dealings with one another. A third party is not likely to promise something of
value in a contract unless he sees real value in the promise he receives in return,
and the value of that return promise will depend heavily on the identity and
creditworthiness of the promisor. If the agent's identity is known, and the

46. Compare Black Equip. & Supply, Inc. v. Koehl & Assocs., Inc., 571 So. 2d 902 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1990), writ denied, 577 So. 2d 12 (1991) and Travis v. Hudnall, 517 So. 2d 1085 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1987) (complete nondisclosure; third party reasonably believed that it was contracting with
agent) with Wilkinson v. Sweeney, 532 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 534 So. 2d 447
(1988) and Duckworth-Woods Tire Serv., Inc. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping), Inc., 430 So. 2d 207
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (partial disclosure; third party knew it was dealing with agent of someone
else, but the someone else was identified with a name that was considered inadequate to fulfill
agent's disclosure obligation).
47. The agent would not be liable if other facts and circumstances provided adequate notice to
the third party of the identity of the principal and if the fact-finder determined that it was this
principal, and not the agent, who was intended to be the party bound by the agreement in question.
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principal's is not, then it is only natural to suppose that the third party was
trading his promise in the contract for the promise of the only other person
whose identity he knew, i.e., the agent.48 Accordingly, where a third party has
no reasonable means of ascertaining the identity of the principal being
represented by a partially-disclosed agent, the inference is said to become
"almost irresistible" that the agent was reasonably understood by the third party
to be binding himself personally as a party to the agreement.49 Mere disclosure
of agency status, without any indication of the identity of the principal, will
almost always result in personal liability on the part of the agent.
More difficult to decide are those cases in which the agent has indicated his
agency status and has provided some information concerning the identification
of the principal, but where the identifying information has proven to be
incomplete or defective in some way. Dangers of misunderstandings between the
third party and the agent do arise in these cases, but the appropriate resolution
of these misunderstandings is far from obvious. None of the inferences are
irresistible anymore. The parties may or may not have expected the agent to
bear personal liability. A closer examination of the facts in each case is
required.
Louisiana courts, failing to see any distinction between partial disclosure and
complete nondisclosure, have glossed over some important factual distinctions.
They have lumped together all cases of inadequate disclosure, calling them all
undisclosed agency cases, and have generally imposed personal liability on a
corporate shareholder/agent when any defect or incompleteness has existed in the
agent's identification of the corporate principal.
The liability imposed by Louisiana's blanket rule has indeed seemed
appropriate in some cases. In one case, a creditor sued a business owner who
had incorporated his business, without telling the creditor, and who had
continued to deal with the creditor under the old proprietorship trade name.50

48. The third party may indeed be consenting to a contract with the agent and the undisclosed
principal, but it is not likely that he is agreeing to contract solely with the principal whose identity
remains completely undisclosed.
49. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 321 cmt. a (1958). The closest example of this type
of case in Louisiana is Centanni v. A.K. Roy, Inc., 258 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), in which
a real estate agent was held personally liable on a real estate sales contract that he had signed as
"Agent for Client (Owner)." Even this case is not a perfect example of the completely-hidden
principal, for the third party could have discovered the identity of the owner of the property, and it
was clear that the agent was purporting to represent someone who at least owned the property being
sold. See Port Ship Serv., Inc. v. Norton, Lilly & Co., 883 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 962, 110 S. Ct. 2575 (1990); Port Ship Serv., Inc. v. International Ship Management & Agencies
Serv., Inc., 800 F.2d 1418 (5th Cir. 1986) (under general common law principles applicable in
maritime disputes, disclosure of agency status and identification of vessel to be served was sufficient
notice to apprise the third party supplier that his contract was with the owner of the vessel rather than
with the agent personally). A better example of complete nondisclosure of the principal's identity
would be a case in which the real estate agent had signed simply as "Agent for Client (Purchaser)."
In that case, the Purchaser might have been anybody.
50. Mike's Serv. Station Supply, Inc. v. Thiele, 391 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), writ
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The imposition of personal liability was proper in this case not because of a
complete lack of disclosure-the creditor knew that it was dealing with a tradenamed business-but because the disclosure that did occur seemed reasonably
to identify the individual proprietor-turned-shareholder as the principal to be
bound."
In other cases, affiliated corporate debtors have tried to attribute some
particular corporate debt to one company rather than another, and to impose on
the third party creditor the responsibility of knowing which of the several
corporations was being identified by the corporate agents' use of similarsounding corporate names. Although courts have recited undisclosed agency
theory in these cases, all they really have done is allow a third party to assume
that the name being used to identify a corporate debtor was the name of the
corporation with which the creditor had originally agreed to deal, and not some
other like-named corporation that was later substituted for the first corporation
without his knowledge.52
Finally, two cases have been decided in which the trade name of an
incorporated business has included the individual name of one of the company's
major shareholders (i.e., "Danny's Automotive Repair" and "Cookie's Auto
Sales"), as if the trade name were being used to identify a proprietorship rather
than a corporation.53 In this sort of case, it might well be reasonable for a
creditor to assume that he was dealing directly with the business owner as
proprietor and not as a shareholder and agent of a separate corporation, and, in
that event, it would be appropriate under partially-disclosed agency analysis to
impose personal liability.
But not all of Louisiana's "undisclosed" agency cases may be defended in
this way; a few seem wrong both in theory and in result. In one case, a
shareholder was held liable after employees of a corporation-owned restaurant
ordered seafood for the restaurant as disclosed agents for "The Captain's
Raft., 5 4 In another case, a corporate shareholder and agent of "Suntans
Unlimited, Inc." was held personally liable on a lease that he had signed strictly
as a disclosed agent for "Suntans Unlimited," having dropped the "Inc." from the
name.55 In this type of case, the agent is disclosing both his agency status and

denied, 396 So. 2d 931 (1981).
51. Id.at 561.
52. Dash Bldg. Materials Ctr., Inc. v. Henning, 560 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990);
Duckworth-Woods Tire Serv., Inc. v. Smith & Johnson (Shipping), Inc., 430 So. 2d 207 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1983). These sorts of cases really do not pose undisclosed agency problems, for they involve
situations in which some disclosure has indeed occurred and in which the creditor is not seeking to
impose liability on the agent at all, but rather on one principal as opposed to another.
53. Thiele, 391 So. 2d 560 ("Danny's Automotive Repair"); Prevost v. Gomez, 251 So. 2d 470
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1971) ("Cookie's Auto Sales").
54. You'll See Seafoods, Inc. v. Gravois, 520 So. 2d 461 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 523
So. 2d 218 (1988).
55., Wilkinson v. Sweeney, 532 So. 2d 243 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 534 So. 2d 447
(1988).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

the identity of his principal. The only defect in the agent's disclosure, if there
really is a defect, is the absence of an indication of corporate status in the
principal's trade name. Nevertheless, Louisiana courts almost always impose
personal liability in these cases, provided that the partially-disclosed agent is also
a shareholder of the corporate principal, and, despite the clear (if arguably
defective) disclosure of agency, the courts claim to be doing so under an
undisclosed agency theory. 6
These are not true undisclosed agency cases. They do not involve a
complete failure by the agent to disclose his agency status or the identity of his
principal; only the corporate status of the trade-named principal remains
undisclosed. Indeed, some of these so-called "undisclosed agency" cases do not
involve efforts to impose liability on agents at all. Despite the "agency" label,
courts have imposed liability on the shareholders of the corporate principal even
when the shareholders were not involved in negotiating the subject transactions
as agents. Conversely, the courts have refused to impose this form of liability
on agents who have used the same kind of trade name in the same kind of
transaction, but were merely agents and not major shareholders in the tradenamed company involved. 7

56. Wilkinson, 532 So. 2d 243; You'll See Seafoods, 520 So. 2d 461; Andrus v. Bourque, 442
So. 2d 1383 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983); R.H.S. (Racing Head Service) v. Fallon, 395 So. 2d 940 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 399 So. 2d 609 (1981); Pat's Furniture Showrooms, Inc. v. Furniture
Warehouse of Houma, Inc., 392 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980). writ denied, 397 So. 2d 803
(1981); Regency Elec., Inc. v. Verges, 360 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Prevost, 251 So. 2d
470; Perhach v. Bender, 147 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962). Cf Martin Home Ctr., Inc. v.
Stafford, 434 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (unclear whether undisclosed agency or undisclosed
corporate status). But see American Plumbing Co. v. Hadwin, 483 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 486 So. 2d 756 (1986) (factual dispute about corporate status disclosure was resolved
in favor of defendant agent); Roran Corp. v. Carron, 345 So. 2d 1239 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977)
(affirming trial court finding that agent had adequately disclosed the corporate status of his business).
In Perhach, 147 So. 2d 18, the shareholder of a Delaware corporation was held liable on a contract
that he signed in the official name of the corporation, Redneb Pipe Company. At the time,
"Company" was not one of the designations of corporate status recognized in Louisiana's corporation
statute. See former La. R.S. 12:4 (1928). Citing some old, non-Louisiana authority contained in
"Words and Phrases," the court held that "company" was not necessarily a corporate designation, and
so held that the disclosure of corporate status had been inadequate. Under current law, adopted in
1968, the word "Company" or the abbreviation "Co." is said to be acceptable as a corporate
designation, provided that neither is preceded by the word "and" or the symbol "&." La. R.S.
12:23(A) (1969). Thus, Perhach would no longer appear to be good authority on this point.
57. Compare You'll See Seafoods, 520 So. 2d 461 (shareholder of a corporation named
"Computer Tax Service of La., Inc.," which owned a restaurant operating under the trade name "The
Captain's Raft," was held personally liable under undisclosed agency theory for contracts that he had
not himself negotiated, but which had been entered into in the restaurant trade name by other,
disclosed agents of the corporation) with Metro Communications, Inc. v. Callen, 596 So. 2d 249 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1992) (nonshareholder employee who signed contract as agent for "Marcello's," a trade
name for restaurant owned by Performance Institute of Southwest Louisiana, Inc., was held not liable;
disclosure was considered adequate).
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What really seems to be troubling the courts in this line of cases is not an
agent's failure to identify his principal, but rather a controlling shareholder's
failure to cause his corporation to do business under a name that apprises the
third party of the principal business' incorporated status. The courts seem
concerned in these cases that the use of a "defective" type of trade name (one
that does not indicate corporate status) could subject a third party to the limited
liability rules of corporation law without his having received any notice of that
limitation of liability at the time of contracting. These courts appear to believe
that shareholders should enjoy corporate law protections against personal liability
only with respect to those transactions in which the other party was told (or
knew or should have known) that he was dealing with a corporation. Thus, these
are not undisclosed, or even partially-disclosed, agency cases. They are
undisclosed corporate status cases.
The reasoning in the undisclosed corporate status cases does have some
intuitive appeal, for it seems wrong to bind a party to an implied limited liability
provision without his knowledge. On closer examination, though, the disclosure
rule that these courts are imposing seems difficult to defend either technically or
practically.
On the technical side, there is no support in the law (except for these
aberrant cases) for the proposition that corporate limited liability is conditioned
on the disclosure of corporate status in each given corporate transaction.
Shareholders are supposed to be shielded from personal liability for the debts of
the corporation by the corporation's separate personality, not by the creditor's
agreement to limited liability in a particular transaction. 8 Corporate names are
indeed supposed to include some designation of corporate status, but trade names
are allowed, 59 and a defective name is not supposed to affect the corporation's
existence as a separate juridical person. 60 Corporations are deemed to exist for
6
all pertinent purposes 61 upon the issuance of a certificate of incorporation,
without regard to the names that they use in their operations. It is common for
corporations to utilize trade names that do not include a designation of corporate
status; a stroll through any shopping mall should confirm this.
Courts do
Admittedly, these technical arguments are inconclusive.
sometimes disregard a corporation's separate personality despite the issuance of

58. See Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1167 (La. 1991), reh'g denied, 592 So.
2d 1282 (1992).
59. MAS Nursing, Inc. v. Burke, 523 So. 2d 909 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 530 So. 2d
570 (1988).
60. La. R.S. 12:23(F) (1969).
61. The state itself may challenge the existence of a defectively-incorporated company, even
if a certificate of incorporation has been issued. As against all other persons, however, including
corporate creditors, a certificate of incorporation is conclusive proof that the corporation is duly
incorporated as a separate juridical person. La. R.S. 12:25(B) (1969).
62. The certificate is conclusive proof of due incorporation against all persons except the state
itself, but once issued, the effective date of incorporation usually relates back to some earlier point,
such as the execution or filing of the articles of incorporation. See La. R.S. 12:25(B). (C) (1969).
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a certificate of incorporation. In contract cases, they tend to do this when it is
inappropriate to hold the corporate creditor to an implied "nonrecourse" clause
in his particular transaction with the corporation. 63 Thus, in practice, despite
inconsistent technical rules, courts do tend to treat corporate limited liability as
an implied contract term in particular transactions. The recognition or rejection
of the separate legal personality in contract cases appears to reflect a court's
judgment about the presence and propriety of a nonrecourse clause in a particular
case.
But even under this nontechnical, interpretation-of-the-contract approach, the
failure to disclose corporate status should result in personal liability on the part
of the shareholder only where an objective interpretation of the contract would
suggest that he was a party to the agreement. To accept this sort of suggestion
the factfinder would have to conclude that the creditor actually did believe, and
reasonably could believe, that the fictitious name used in the contract was
intended not to identify the fictitious entity that actually owned the business, but
rather the individuals who happened to be the shareholders of the fictitious entity.
In effect, the factfinder would have to believe that proprietorships, rather than
corporations, were the norm in business, so that a person dealing with a business
named "Wal-Mart" or "Suntans Unlimited" actually could believe, reasonably,
that he was dealing with the shareholders of "Wal-Mart" or of "Suntans
Unlimited" in their individual capacities as proprietors, and not with the business
organizations themselves. That would seem to be a rather strange belief.
It seems far more likely that a person who was dealing with a business
operating under an obviously fictitious name such as "Wal-mart" or "Suntans
Unlimited," would assume that he was dealing with whomever it was that
actually owned the business. If, as usual, the owner turned out to be a
corporation or other form of limited liability entity, the creditor would have no
reason to be surprised. Most modern businesses are conducted through
corporations or other forms of limited liability entities, and modern consumers
are quite familiar with the "corporate" or "company" form of business.
Certainly some circumstances might exist under which the separate existence
of a corporation should be disregarded, or in which a customer had become
justifiably confused about the identity of a purported corporate principal. In
those cases, theories of veil piercing and partial disclosure should be used to
impose liability in a way that is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the
parties' contractual dealings. However, the mere failure to tack an "Inc." onto
the end of a corporate trade name ought not result in the imposition of liability
on the corporation's shareholders under any theory. Whether the matter is
approached technically or practically, the "disclosure of corporate status" cases
seem wrongly decided.
Of course, from a business planning standpoint, it does not matter much that
the corporate status cases may be wrohgly decided. The planner must treat these

63.

See Morris, supra note 1, at 292-96.
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cases as the controlling law until they are overruled. The owner of a small
business corporation should make sure that all names used to identify his
business are names that do indeed disclose corporate status. Business signs,
cards, stationery, forms, receipts, and checks all should include some sort of
corporate designation. In transactions carried out on forms supplied by others,
a "corporate status" name should always be used. Where no other form of
writing is to be generated, the owner or agent should consider providing the other
party with a business card that indicates the identity and corporate status of the
business that he is representing.
V. DEFECTS IN CORPORATE AUTHORIZATION

The third and final way for a corporate participant to lose his usual agency
law protection against contractual liability is to exceed his authority as agent.
This form of liability appears to be relatively unusual in practice. Indeed, these
corporate authority issues merit attention not so much for the exposure they
create, but for the distinctive nature of corporation law rules that are supposed
to be controlling.
Corporations, as legal fictions, can conduct their business only through the
acts of their agents. In theory, these agents are supposed to obtain their
authority, either directly or indirectly, from a decision of the corporate board of
directors' that is made in one of two ways: at a duly convened meeting of the
board65 or through the written consent of all the directors.6 While corporations may have agents whose powers and appointments were never considered
by the board itself (an authorized corporate officer may hire corporate employees, for example 67), these indirectly-authorized agents are still supposed to have
only those powers that some other person (such as the corporate president) had
been authorized by the board to confer. In one way or another, all corporate
agents theoretically should be able to trace their authority back to some
procedurally-correct decision by the corporation's board of directors. 68 Absent

64. Subject to provisions in a corporation's articles or bylaws and to certain limited
shareholder-voting requirements inthe corporation statute itself (e.g., for mergers and amendments
ofthe corporate articles), all corporate powers are vested inthe corporation's board of directors. La.
R.S. 12:81(A) (1969). In the normal course of corporate operations, shareholders-as
such-participate in corporate management only indirectly through the exercise ofelecting the board
of directors, the body that holds all direct management powers. See La. R.S. 12:81(B) (1969)
(shareholders elect directors).

65. A duly convened meeting requires such notice as the bylaws provide, subject to certain
waiver-of-notice rules, and requires that aquorum of directors (i.e., amajority of the directors) be
present. If a quorum ispresent at aduly-noticed meeting, then the directors take action by avote
of the majority of the directors present. La. R.S. 12:81(C)(6), (7)(1969).
66. La. R.S. 12:81(C)(9) (1969).
67. Dunham v.Anderson-Dunham, Inc., 466 So. 2d 1317 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 472
So. 2d 29 (1985).
68. La. R.S. 12:82(D) (1969). Because all corporate powers are vested in the board of
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this procedurally-correct form of actual authority, the corporation theoretically
should not be bound by the acts of its purported agents.69
Of course, it is possible under general principles of agency law for certain
acts of an agent to bind the principal even if the act was not carried out in
accordance with the agent's actual authority.
Apparent authority 0 and
ratification,7 particularly tacit ratification,72 are often used to bind a principal

directors, corporate powers may be exercised by other persons only to the extent that the exercise of
such powers has been authorized by the board, either in the bylaws or through board resolutions.
La. R.S. 12:81(A) (1969). Indeed, although the corporation statute requires that every corporation
elect at least three officers, namely, a president, treasurer, and secretary, the statute says absolutely
nothing about the powers that these officers are to hold. That is left entirely to the board of directors.
Officers and agents have only such powers as the board decides to confer on them. La. R.S.
12:82(A), (D) (1969).
69. See Jeanerette Rice & Milling Co. v. Durocher, 123 La. 160, 48 So. 780 (1909)
(recognizing some possibility of informal power arising from business practice, but emphasizing that
the source of an officer's authority is proper action by a board of directors); Dunham, 466 So. 2d
1317 (actual express authority stems from statute, articles, bylaws or board resolutions); Fluidair
Prods., Inc. v. Robeline-Marthaville Water Sys., 465 So. 2d 969 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985) ("An officer
of a corporation cannot act without authority of its board of directors or bylaws. La. R.S. 12:81.
The office of president in itself confers no power to bind the corporation or control its property.");
Margolis v. Allen Mortgage & Loan Corp., 268 So. 2d 714 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972) ("It is axiomatic
that the authority to act on behalf of a corporation can only be conferred by the charter or a
resolution of the Board of Directors."): Rivercity v. American Can Co.. 600 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. La.
1984), affd, 753 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1985) (in rejecting a self-dealing transaction by board chairman,
court cited the Margolis rule, supra). But see George A. Broas Co. v. Hibernia Homestead & Say.
Ass'n, 134 So. 2d 356 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) ("[T]he president of a corporation is clothed with
apparent authority to transact business on his firm's behalf...").
70. The Civil Code does not recognize apparent authority; indeed, it seems plainly to reject it.
Apparent authority, by definition, binds the principal to acts of an apparent agent that the principal
really did not authorize. See, e.g., Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d 1, 3 (La. 1987). The Civil Code
provides that whatever an agent does which exceeds the power granted to him by the principal "is
null and void with regard to the principal, unless ratified," La. Civ. Code art. 3010, and that a
principal is bound to execute only those engagements contracted by the agent "conformably to the
power confided to him." La. Civ. Code art. 3021. "For anything further he is not bound except
insofar as he has expressly ratified it." Id.
Despite these Code provisions, the jurisprudence has uniformly accepted the availability of the
apparent authority theory. E.g., Tedesco v. Gentry Dev. Co., 540 So. 2d 960 (La. 1989) (approving
of the theory generally, but disapproving of its application in a transaction involving immovable
property where the alleged authority of the agent was not in writing); Boulos, 503 So. 2d at 3-4
(approving of the theory, but finding no apparent authority in the case presented); Interstate Elec. Co.
v. Frank Adam Elec. Co., 173 La. 103, 136 So. 283 (1931) (finding apparent authority); Pesson v.
Kleckley, 526 So. 2d 1220 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (finding apparent authority); Hawthorne v. Kinder
Corp., 513 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (finding apparent authority). Courts acknowledge that
apparent authority is not recognized by the Civil Code, as if it were silent on the point, but they gloss
over the fact that the Code seems actually to reject the concept. See, e.g., Tedesco, 540 So. 2d at
963.
71. See La. Civ. Code arts. 1843, 3021.
72. La.Civ. Code art. 1843. The ratification language in the mandate articles, which is the
original 1825 language, appears to require that the ratification be express, not tacit. The pertinent
mandate article is thus inconsistent with Article 1843. Arguably, because the mandate articles are
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to an act that he claims was not actually authorized at the time. Yet even these
substitutes for actual authority always depend upon acts by the principal." An
agent cannot bootstrap himself into a position of authority simply by his own
acts or representations.74
In a corporate setting, the "acts of the principal" element should mean,
theoretically, that the corporation would not be bound unless the corporation
itself had taken the necessary actions in the statutorily-prescribed fashion.
Without those kinds of official corporate actions, the only evidence of authority
for the transaction in question would be some similarly unauthorized actions by
corporate agents or shareholders. In that case, no apparent authority or
ratification could exist in the technically-correct sense of those terms.
However, except for major corporations and major transactions in smaller
corporations (where lawyers tend to be more heavily involved), the strict
statutory theories of authority appear to have little to do either with the way that
real corporations are actually managed or with the way that real disputes about
corporate authority are judicially resolved. Closely-held corporations, which
overwhelmingly dominate the reported corporation law cases in Louisiana, tend
to be operated directly and informally by their shareholders-much as a
proprietorship or partnership might be-without all the procedural complexities
Major
and formalities that are contemplated by the corporate statute."
shareholders typically participate in the operation of the corporation without any
formal board authorization, so that the only way that "acts of the principal" can
ever be found to establish any form of authority, whether actual, apparent, or
after-the-fact, is by looking to the behavior of these participating shareholders.
Technically, these shareholders are supposed to have little or no direct power, but
in fact they usually run things.76
If courts were to insist on strict adherence to statutory formalities in the face
of this nearly universal informality in actual corporate operations, it would
become nearly impossible for third parties to enforce their contracts with
corporations. The corporations could ratify those contracts that they themselves
wished to enforce and could repudiate other contracts as unauthorized. This

part of a more narrowly-constructed, nominate contract portion of the Code, those articles should
control over the more general provision set forth in Article 1843 of the obligations title. However,
the obligations article is much more recent (having been adopted in 1984), and is much more
consistent with the jurisprudence. There is little doubt, practically speaking, that tacit ratification is
permitted.
73. E.g., Tedesco, 540 So. 2d at 963 (apparent authority); La. Civ. Code art. 1843; Rebman v.
Reed, 286 So. 2d 341, 342 (La. 1973) (ratification).
74. Boulos, 503 So. 2d at 3; Everett v. Foxwood Properties, 584 So. 2d 1233, 1237-38 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1991); Pailet v. Guillory, 315 So. 2d 893, 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
75. See Riggins v. Dixie Shoring Co., 590 So. 2d 1164, 1169 (La. 1991), reh 'g denied, 592 So.
2d 1282 (1992) (informal management of small, closely-held corporation met "spirit" of separate
corporate governance requirements in veil-piercing law); F. Hodge O'Neal & Robert B. Thompson,
O'Neal's Close Corporations § 8.02 (3d ed. 1988).
76. O'Neal & Thompson, supra note 75, §§ 8.03, 8.04.
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tactical advantage would not matter in most cases because the corporation would

perform most of its contracts just as most other parties would, without resort to
litigation. But in the very cases where it would matter most, where the
corporation was willing to litigate rather than to perform, the corporation would

enjoy an advantage that most other parties would not, namely, the ability to
repudiate selected contracts on the grounds that the statutory procedures for

corporate authorization had not been followed.
Fortunately, courts normally do not insist on strict adherence to corporate
formalities in the context of closely-held corporations. Except where other types
of formalities, e.g., writings, are required by some other, non-corporate rule of
law (as in immovable property transactions 77), courts in close-corporation
authority cases tend to look through form to substance. They do not let the
shareholders use a lack of board resolutions as an excuse to get their corporations
out of contracts that they, the dominant shareholders, have authorized (actually
or apparently) or ratified. 7 Procedural defects tend to be used to upset a
corporate transaction only when it is possible to see a causal connection between
the procedural violation and some discernable harm to a nonconsenting 79 person
whom the procedure was designed to protect.80 The mere presence of a
procedural defect will not nullify the transaction.8
Unfortunately, the courts typically do not justify their conclusions by explicit
reference to the characteristics of close-corporation governance. Instead, they
tend just to gloss over the problem. Without acknowledging what they are
doing, the courts simply pretend that the acts of a major corporate shareholder
may be treated as the acts of his corporation for purposes of establishing

77. Tedesco, 540 So. 2d 960 (testimonial proof cannot be used to prove agent's authority to
bind his principal to contract to sell immovable property, regardless of whether the alleged authority
is actual or apparent). Although the court did not address the issue directly, the Tedesco reasoning
would suggest that ratification would require the same written evidence as would actual or apparent
authority.
78. See, e.g., Hotard v. Fleitas, Inc., 67 So. 2d 345 (La. App. Orl. 1953) (corporation's letter
agreement, signed by the three individuals who owned all of the corporation's stock, and who served
as its three directors, was enforceable against corporation notwithstanding lack of board resolution).
79. Consent to a transaction need not occur in a formal, statutory fashion. Informal
acquiescence is sufficient, and may even be deemed to occur through informal agency relationships
with other participants in the corporation. See Ogden v. Culpepper, 474 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1985) (acquiescence of father to issuance of stock was imputed to his children where children
had allowed their father to look after their interests in the corporation).
80. Fluidair Prods., Inc. v. Robeline-Marthaville Water Sys., 465 So. 2d 969 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1985) (premature, unauthorized acceptance of contract work by recently-appointed president of water
company); Rivercity v. American Can Co., 600 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd, 753 F.2d 1300
(5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1985) (unauthorized self-dealing); Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 490 F. Supp.
1320 (E.D. La. 1980). affd, 652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. Unit A Aug. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163, 102 S. Ct. 1037 (1982) (forged resolutions and shareholder consents ineffective to
bind corporation to mortgage of its property).
81. See Ogden, 474 So. 2d 1346 (issuance of stock by unlawful one-member board was merely
voidable, not void, and was legally-effective in this case due to implicit ratification by representative
of other shareholders).
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authority or ratification. They say that a corporation is bound by contracts that
the "corporation" appeared to have authorized or ratified, when what they are
really examining is the statutorily unauthorized behavior of the corporation's
dominant shareholder(s). 2
It seems unlikely that the courts really believe that one statutorily unauthorized act can be redeemed (i.e., authorized or ratified) by a series of other
similarly unauthorized, unratified acts. Instead, these informal authority cases
seem to reflect the sound, if implicit, conviction on the part of the courts that
major, actively-participating shareholders of small corporations should be treated
as having bound their corporations to all transactions that they (the shareholders)
have in fact authorized, without regard to whether the authorizations occurred in
the statutorily-prescribed fashion.8 3 That sort of informal, direct approach to
corporate governance is far more consistent with prevailing practice, and with the
reasonable expectations of contracting parties, than is the overly formalized,
indirect, centralized model of corporate governance contemplated by the
corporate statute.
Louisiana courts are not alone in their apparent fudging on the technical
rules in close-corporation authority disputes. The practice appears to be common
in most states in which no special arrangements have been made for closely-held
corporations." Without some special statutory or jurisprudential rules for
closely-held corporations, courts are effectively forced to choose between
technical accuracy in their reasoning and pragmatic fairness in their results.
Fairness, thank goodness, has tended to prevail.
The law might be improved from a technical standpoint either by new
legislation or by new jurisprudential theories. Examples can be seen in the
legislation and cases of other jurisdictions. Legislation that is written explicitly
to serve the needs of closely-held corporations typically deletes the requirement
of a board of directors and allows the corporation to be managed in essentially
the same way as a partnership. The better cases tend to attribute certain built-in

82. See, e.g., Holloway v. Acadian News Agency, Inc., 488 So. 2d 328 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
83. O'Neal & Thompson, supra note 75, § 8.05. In practice, close corporations tend to operate
in much the same way as partnerships: ownership and management functions are unified in the

shareholders, and not artificially separated as the corporate statute requires. Compare La. Civ. Code
art. 2807 (most partnership decisions allowed by informal majority approval) and La. Civ. Code art.
2814 (except for certain immovable property transactions, each partner is a mandatary of the
partnership in the ordinary course of its business, and contrary agreements do not affect the rights
of good-faith third parties) with La. R.S. 12:81(A), 82(D) (1969) (subject to certain limited
exceptions, all corporate powers are vested in the board of directors; officers and agents have only
such powers as conferred by the bylaws or by resolutions of the board). The Mississippi Supreme
Court has explicitly acknowledged the analogy between close corporations and partnerships and has
ruled explicitly that "an executive officer of a close corporation... in carrying on the usual business
of a corporation has the same apparent authority as a partner in a partnership as against third parties
who in good faith rely upon his representation." Baxter-Porter & Sons Well Servicing, Inc. v.
Venture Oil Corp., 488 So. 2d 793, 796 (Miss. 1986).
84. O'Neal &Thompson, supra note 75, § 8.05.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

powers to certain corporate positions, rejecting the statutory requirement that all
power be based on some statutorily prescribed action by the board of directors.
This power is sometimes called "apparent authority," but might better be
described as a form of power inherently associated with the corporate position
involved."5 Mississippi has taken a sound approach. It has acknowledged
explicitly the similarities between partnerships and close corporations, and so has
applied partnership-like rules to resolve agency disputes in that setting. 6
Statutes and cases that acknowledge explicitly the special character of close
corporations are superior to the current law in Louisiana because they reflect
more candidly and accurately the reasons why courts reach the results they do
in the close corporation setting. The current approach reaches the right result
most of the time, but it poses the danger of creating precedent in one setting, the
closely-held corporation setting, that may be inappropriate in other settings. The
court's glossing over formality problems may not be warranted in all cases in
which an agent is alleged to have exceeded his authority. By linking the more
liberal governance rules to the setting in which the rules are considered to be
justified, the courts could avoid the creation of potentially overbroad rules in
other settings.
A. Liabilityfor Exceeding Authority-Code Provisions
The liability of a corporate agent for exceeding his authority is determined
by agency law, not corporation law. The corporation statute says how the agent
or officer is supposed to get his agency authority, i.e., through statutorily-correct
actions by the board of directors, but nothing about what ought to happen when

85. The "powers-of-the-position" approach would shift the emphasis from the acts of the
principal to the normal commercial expectations associated with the position involved. The beginning
assumption would not be that the agent had only such powers as the principal had actually or
apparently conferred; the burden would not be placed on the third party to show what. things the
principal did to make him or the agent believe that the agent was authorized to act as he did. Rather,
the third party would be permitted to assume that the agent involved had the powers normally
associated with his position, unless the principal could show either that he, the principal, had not
acquiesced in the agent's assuming the position in question or that the third party had reason to know
that the agent really did not possess the type of authority typical for that position. This latter theory
is the one used in partnership law. In partnership law, a partner's authority is based purely on his
position as a partner. The partnership can avoid liability for the acts of a partner only if those acts
involved a transaction in immovable property, or if they were outside the ordinary course of business
of the partnership. La. Civ. Code art. 2814. To win an authority dispute with a partnership, the third
party need only prove that the purported agent of the partnership was a partner, that the act of the
agent was in the ordinary course of the partnership's business, and that the third party had no
knowledge or notice of any pertinent limitations on the agent's authority. He would not be required
to prove, as he would under an apparent authority doctrine, that some actually-authorized agent of
the partnership had done something affirmative to indicate to him, the third party, that the partner
in question did in fact have the authority to enter into the disputed transaction.
86. Venture Oil, 488 So. 2d 793.
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that authority is exceeded." These issues are left to agency law, where in most
contexts the corporation is treated as the principal, the corporate officers,
employees, and other representatives are treated as agents, and the corporation's
customers, suppliers, and the like are treated as third parties.
In the common law, an agent normally is deemed to be subject to a duty to
his principal not to exceed his agency authority88 and to warrant that authority
to the third parties with whom he deals.8 9 If the agent exceeds his authority in
violation of these implied duties or warranties, then he may be held liable either
to the third party9° or to the principal, 9' whichever suffers the pertinent
damages. 92
The Louisiana Civil Code does not cover the first of these issues, the duty
of the agent to the principal not to exceed his agency authority, probably because
the Code does not recognize any mechanism (such as apparent authority) by
which an agent's unauthorized and unratified juridical acts could bind the
principal in the first place. Unauthorized acts are declared "null and void with
regard to the principal" except to the extent ratified, 93 so the principal has no
need of recovery against the agent, for the agent's unauthorized juridical acts.94

87. Corporate officers and directors are said to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation
and its shareholders, but except for the general conferral of all corporate powers on the board of
directors, no effort is made in the statute to deal with questions of officer or agent authority. See La.
R.S. 12:81(A), 91 (1969).
88. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 383 (1958).
89. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 329 (1958). The implied warranty may be disclaimed
by the agent and does not arise if the third party knows that the agent is not authorized. Id.
90. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 329, 330 (1958).
91. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 383, 399, 400, 401 (1958).
92. The alternative nature of the agent's liability (either to the principal or to the third party,
but not to both) is seldom discussed in Louisiana, though at least one case has said that this would
be the rule. Item Co. v. LaPlace Chamber of Commerce, 16 So. 2d 567, 572 (La. App. Orl. 1944).
The common law justification for the rule is persuasive. Under the common law, if a principal did
not actually authorize the agent's act, he is still bound if the agent acted within his apparent authority
or inherent agency power, or if the principal ratifies the unauthorized act. In these cases, the third
party is not damaged by the agent's exceeding his authority, and will not have any claims against the
agent. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 329, cmt. (f) (1958) ("[lf he [the agent] acts in violation
of orders but within his power to bind his principal (see §§ 159-178) [e.g., apparent authority], the
agent is not liable to the other party to the transaction since, if the principal becomes a party, the
rights of the other party are not affected by the fact that the agent committed a wrong to his
principal."). The agent, however, will have breached his duty to the principal to act only as
authorized, and will be liable to the principal for any damages caused by this breach of duty.
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 383 (1958). If, on the other hand, the principal is not bound
under any theory, then the third party has not received what the agent warranted or represented, an
authorized transaction binding on the principal. Thus, the third party is entitled to recover damages.
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 329, 330 (1958).
93. La. Civ. Code art. 3010. The principal is bound to execute only those engagements
contracted by the agent "conformably to the power confided to him." La. Civ. Code art. 3021. For
anything further, the principal "is not bound, except in so far as he has expressly ratified it." Id.
94. Agency and servant relationships may overlap, of course, and a master may be held
vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of his servants in the course and scope of their
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In practice, of course, things are not so simple. Despite the language of the
Code, Louisiana courts have indeed accepted the common law doctrine of
apparent authority.95 Hence, they have created, at least theoretically, the need
to deal with the principal's rights against an agent who exceeds his authority.
Nevertheless, the reported decisions on this topic are sparse, presumably because
the apparent authority theory tends to be raised in those cases in which the agent
is incapable of paying the claim anyway.' The few cases that do exist support
the same rule as the common law, that an agent may be held liable to his
principal for the damages caused by the agent's exceeding his authority. 97 Most
of the decisions in this field either fail to cite authority," or simply follow

employment, even if their tortious acts were unauthorized. La. Civ. Code art. 2320. The discussion
in the text is concerned strictly with the liability of a principal that arises out of his agent's
purporting to engage in juridical acts on the principal's behalf.
95. E.g., Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 540 So. 2d 960 (La. 1989) (approving of the theory
generally, but disapproving of its application in a transaction involving immovable property where
the alleged authority of the agent was not in writing); Boulos v. Morrison, 503 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (La.
1987) (approving of the theory, but finding no apparent authority in the case presented); Interstate
Elec. Co. v. Frank Adam Elec. Co., 173 La. 103, 136 So. 283 (1931) (finding apparent authority);
Pesson v. Kleckley, 526 So. 2d 1220 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988) (finding apparent authority); Hawthorne
v. Kinder Corp., 513 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987) (finding apparent authority).
96. Where an agent has indeed exceeded his actual authority and is capable of paying the claim
involved, it would normally be easier to obtain a judgment directly against the agent for the claim,
rather than imposing liability on the principal and making him recover from the agent. Apparent
authority functions mainly as a device for allocating the risk of the agent's disappearance or
insolvency. (If apparent authority exists, the third party collects his claim from the principal and lets
the principal worry about recovering from the agent, while if apparent authority does not exist, the
third party is forced td assert his claim against the agent himself.) Given these functions, apparent
authority tends to be discussed in those cases in which there would be no practical point in the
principal's pursuing a judgment against the agent for exceeding his authority; the agent would tend
to be absent or incapable of paying the claim anyway.
97. Wagenvoord Broadcasting Co. v. Lonigan, 221 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969)
(collection agency held liable to creditor for exceeding authority in settling debtor's account with the
creditor where agent had not been misled concerning its authority through any negligence or fault
of the principal); Thompson v. Levy, 12 Orl. App. 261 (La. App. 1915) (shipping agent liable to
owner of furniture for freight costs incurred by principal in shipping furniture from unauthorized
destination, Arcola, Mississippi, to correct destination, Areola, Louisiana); Lowe & Pattison v. Bell
& McLay, 6 La. Ann. 28 (Orleans 1851) (corn ordered by agent at price higher than that authorized
by principal was to be treated as ordered for agent's own account; agent could not recover from
principal for losses suffered on resale of corn at lower price); Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. v.
Martin-Lebreton Ins. Agency, 242 F.2d 951 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 870, 78 S. Ct. 121
(1957) (insurance agency liable to insurer under Louisiana law for exceeding authority in writing
building performance bond; citing only common law authorities and court's own earlier decisions);
Canada Steamships Lines v. Inland Waterways Corp., 166 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1948) (agent liable to
principal under Louisiana law for unauthorized method of "clearing" cargo, resulting in tax on cargo
of castor oil); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 347 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. La. 1972) (brokerage firm
liable to customer under Louisiana agency law for losses arising out of unauthorized commodities
transaction).
98. Wagenvoord, 221 So. 2d at 323.
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jurisprudential rules that were drawn originally from common law sources; they
do not cite the Civil Code."
If one had to find Civil Code authority for the results in these cases, then
Article 3002 or 3003 might be pressed into service. Article 3002 provides that
an agent "is bound to discharge the functions of his procuration" and that he is
"responsible to his principal for the damages that may result from the nonperformance of his duty."'"
If acting outside authority were considered a
breach of the duty to "discharge the functions" of the procuration, then the agent
could indeed be held liable to the principal under this provision. No reported
case has endorsed this theory.
Article 3003 imposes liability on an agent for his fault or neglect. Although,
strictly speaking, a violation of instructions might or might not involve fault or
negligence in the normal tort-law sense of the terms, actual authority under
agency law does depend in part on the reasonableness of the agent's interpretations of his instructions. In that sense, perhaps, exceeding authority constitutes
I
"fault." One federal case, interpreting Louisiana law, has used this theory. 0
On the second of the issues, the duty owed by the agent to the third party
not to exceed his authority, the Civil Code does have something to say, and what
it says is rather close in effect to what the common law says: an agent
normally 2 is liable to the third party if he exceeds his authority, but absent
a personal guarantee, an agent acting within his authority is not liable for the
performance of the obligations that he contracts in the name and on behalf of his
principal. The two key articles are Article 3010 and Article 3013. Article 3010
provides:
The attorney can not go beyond the limits of his procuration; whatever
he does exceeding his power is null and void with regard to the
principal, unless ratified by the latter, and the attorney is alone bound
by it in his individual capacity.
Article 3013 provides:
The mandatary is responsible to those with whom he contracts, only
when he has bound himself personally, or when he has exceeded his
authority without having exhibited his powers.

99. Lowe & Pattison, 6 La. Ann. at 28; Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co., 242 F.2d at 951;
Canada Steamships Lines, 166 F.2d at 57 (citing Louisiana cases not on point and relying on
common law rules).
100. La. Civ. Code art. 3002.
101. McCurnin, 347 F. Supp. at 573.
102. The agent would not be liable for exceeding his authority, either under the common law
or under the Louisiana Civil Code, if he had made it clear to the third party that he was not making
any representations or giving any warranties concerning his authority. As discussed later in the text,
some of the Louisiana jurisprudence is more liberal than the common law in allowing the agent to
shift to the third party the risk of misunderstanding the extent of the agent's authority. See infra text
accompanying notes 115-25.
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The "exhibiting of powers" mentioned in Article 3013 merits special
attention. The phrase suggests that an agent might exceed his authority without
bearing personal liability. A similar point is made by Article 3012:
The mandatary, who has communicated his authority to a person with
whom he contracts in that capacity, is not answerable to the latter for
anything done beyond it, unless he has entered into a personal guarantee.
The point of the "exhibition of powers" and "communication of authority"
phrases seems to be to shift to the third party the risk of misinterpreting the
scope of authority granted to the agent by the principal. Normally, under Article
3010, an agent who had exceeded his authority would be bound personally by
the contracts that he had negotiated, much as a common law agent would be
personally liable to the third party for violating his implied warranty of authority.
But if the agent had "exhibited his powers," then the result would be different.
The agent would be apprising the third party of the pertinent facts and letting the
third party make his own decision about the extent of the agent's authority. If
the third party then decided to deal with the agent, the third party would be
making his own decision based on the terms of the exhibited powers, and would
not be relying on any implied representation or warranty of authority by the
agent. If it turned out that the third party was wrong in his interpretation of the
exhibited powers, then he himself would be deemed simply to have misjudged
the situation. He alone would bear the loss, without any recourse against the
agent."13
In the usual case, of course, nothing is going to be said one way or the other
about the authority of the agent. The agent is going to assume that his act is
authorized, and so is the third party. What happens in that case if the act turns
out not to have been authorized? Who bears the risk? The common law would
say "the agent." Much as a seller is deemed to warrant his ownership of the
thing sold, the common law deems an agent to represent or warrant implicitly to
the third party that he, the agent, possesses authority from his principal to take
the actions that he takes. "
The agent may avoid his implied warranty of authority under the common
law by manifesting to the third party his intention not to provide it, and he may
also avoid liability for breaching the warranty if he shows that the third party
actually knew the pertinent facts anyway. Subject to these two exceptions,
though, an agent who exceeds his authority is liable to the third party for any

103. See Gulf South Enters., Inc. v. Delta Materials Operating Co., 137 So. 2d 427 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962) (agent not personally liable to third party for exceeding authority in purporting to bind
bail bond company as surety on commercial promissory note; written power of attorney exhibited to
third party made it clear that agent's authority was limited to bail bonds).
104. Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 329, 330 (1958); Harold G. Reuschlein & William A.
Gregory, The Law of Agency & Partnership §§ 119-20 (2d ed. 1990). For a Louisiana decision using
warranty language see Harvey v. Hoyle, 14 Orl. App. 152, 157 (La. App. 1917).
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damages resulting from his unauthorized acts, including any amounts by which
the third party would have benefitted had the acts been authorized as warranted.
The language of the pertinent Civil Code articles would seem to support
essentially 5 the same results: the mandatary is said to be liable under Article
3010 for exceeding his authority, seemingly automatically, unless he has
"communicated his authority" or "exhibited his powers" as contemplated in
Articles 3012 and 3013. The point of these communications under Articles 3012
and 3013 would appear to be to inform the third party that the agent was not
making any representations or warranties concerning his authority, and that he
was letting the third party make his own decisions on the authority question. In
common-law terminology, the agent would be said either to be disclaiming his
warranty of authority, or to be telling the third party the facts necessary to
preclude liability for any breach of the warranty.
The Code articles do not address the effects of the third party's knowledge
about the agent's authority when that knowledge has been acquired from some
source other than the communications of the agent himself. Logically, the failure
of an agent to make adequate disclosure concerning his authority should not
create liability if the information to be disclosed is known by the third party
anyway, from another source. The agent should not bear personal liability for
exceeding his authority if he can prove that the third party was aware, or should
have been aware under the circumstances, that sufficient uncertainty existed
concerning the agent's authority to make an inference of an implied warranty by
the agent implausible. In other words, the fact finder should determine whether
the agent was implicitly warranting his authority, i.e., acting as if he had
authority, no question about it, or instead was "quitclaiming" his actions to the
third party, i.e., taking the actions necessary to bind the principal if authority
existed, but letting the third party exercise his own judgment on whether that
authority really did exist.
Actual disclosure of the pertinent facts by the agent should be sufficient as
a matter of law to shift the authority risk to the third party, but the reverse
should not be true. A nondisclosing agent should not be liable to the third party
for exceeding his authority if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person
would have understood that he was dealing with the agent at his own risk. The
issue is not one of comparative negligence, however, but of objective contract

105. The basic rules appear to be the same; however, the Louisiana Civil Code clearly rejects
some of the implications of the common law theory. The common law's warranty theory, combined
with its approach to authority questions in connection with the death or incapacity of the principal,
has led to some questionable rules. An agent may be held liable to a third party for breaching his
warranty of authority if it turns out that his previously-authorized actions had become unauthorized
due to the intervening death or incapacity of the principal, regardless of whether the agent knew or
had reason to know about the death or incapacity. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 329, cmt. b
(1958). In contrast, under the Civil Code, the mere incapacity of the principal does not automatically
terminate the agent's authority, and actions taken by an agent in ignorance of his principal's death,
if otherwise authorized, are considered valid. La. Civ. Code arts. 3027(B), 3032-3033.
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interpretation: whether the third party knew enough about problems with the
agent's authority to support the inference that the third party was accepting the
agent's actions for whatever they were worth, without the agent's normal
warranty of authority.
The reported cases do not discuss this precise issue, but they do follow
similar rules when the issue is the disclosure of an agent's representative status,
rather than the extent of his authority. These cases say that disclosure is the
better practice, but that even without disclosure an agent is permitted to avoid
liability by proving that the third party already knew or had adequate notice of
the information that was supposed to be disclosed. Although the information to
be disclosed is different in the authority cases than in the disclosure-of-agency
cases, the underlying theory would not seem to change. The agent should be
liable unless he proves either adequate disclosure or adequate knowledge or
notice of the pertinent facts, but he should not be required to prove that he
himself was the source of the pertinent information.
Planiol supports the foregoing interpretations. He justifies the agent's
liability to the third party on grounds of warranty.' 06 In Planiol's view, if an
agent's acts turn out to have been outside his authority, so that the principal is
not bound, then the liability of the agent should depend on the agent's disclosure,
or the third party's independent knowledge of the pertinent information:
Third persons, therefore, who deal with the mandatary may in the end
find that they have entered into a useless contract where the act was not
authorized by the procuration and where the principal has refused to
ratify. Can they in such a case proceed against the mandatary and hold
him responsible for the damages they have suffered? That depends: if
the mandatary has made his powers sufficiently known, they are
considered as having dealt with him at their risk; if on the contrary, the
powers of the mandatary were not sufficiently known to them, the latter
was in fault and is personally liable for everything he may have done
beyond his mandate. °7
Notice that the only liability that Planiol actually recognizes is that arising
when both of two conditions are present: the mandatary has not made his
powers sufficiently known and those powers are not sufficiently known by the
third party. Nondisclosure by the agent does not produce liability if the pertinent
facts are "sufficiently known" anyway, but without this independent knowledge,
the mandatary does become personally liable to the third party if he exceeds his
authority without exhibiting his powers.

106. According to Planiol, the mandatary who acts beyond his authority is bound by the
unauthorized act unless he obtains the principal's ratification. This, he says, "is the simple
application of the clause of warranty," referring to another provision concerning the promesse de
porte-fort. 2 Planiol, supra note 9, 1 1020, 2256.
107. 2 Planiol, supra note 9. 1 2256, at 298.
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Planiol's interpretation is thus very close to the common law theory that an
agent is automatically liable for a breach of an implied warranty of authority,
unless the agent disclosed the pertinent facts concerning the terms of his
authority, or unless the third party already had sufficient knowledge of those
facts. In the typical case, where nothing about authority is said by the agent, nor
known independently by the third party, the common law and Louisiana Civil
Code appear to be in agreement: the agent becomes personally liable to the third
party for acts that he takes without proper authority.
B. Exceeding Authority-Jurisprudence
The Louisiana jurisprudence essentially contains two competing lines of
cases concerning an agent's liability to a third party for exceeding his authority.
One line concentrates on the normally automatic liability called for by Article
3010, with little attention to the meaning and effects of the exculpatory language
in Articles 3012 and 3013 about an agent's "exhibiting" or "communicating" his
powers,1 08 while the other line of cases emphasizes this exculpatory language
to the virtual exclusion of any form of automatic liability under Article 3010.109
Under the first line of cases, the warranty rule is followed without much
attention to the possibilities of disclaimers, while under the second, the warranty
theory is essentially rejected in favor of a misrepresentation theory of recovery.
A good example of the first line of cases is Vordenbaumen v. Gray."' In
that case, one brother purported to act not only for himself but also for his
brother as his agent in promising to pay a debt owed by the brothers' deceased
mother. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal ruled that the promise
in question was legally enforceable,' but noted that the record did not contain
any evidence that the first brother had been authorized by the second to make
any such promise on his behalf. Neither did it contain any evidence that the
second brother had ratified the promise or made any independent promise on his
own. Under those circumstances, the court ruled that the first brother was
personally liable not only for his own personal share of the joint promise, but

108. Vales v. Doley, 297 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gunn,
286 So. 2d 404 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Nationwide Fin. Co. v. Pitre, 243 So. 2d 326 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971); Cooley v. Al Hirt Enters., Inc., 180 So. 2d 841 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965); Fontenot v.
Fontenot, 175 So. 2d 910 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Vordenbaumen v. Gray, 189 So. 342 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1939); Opelousas-St. Landry Bank & Trust Co. v. Bruner, 13 La. App. 337, 125 So. 507 (1st
Cir. 1929).
109. Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 521 So. 2d 717 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988), aff d, 540 So. 2d
960 (1989); Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Viser, 140 So. 2d 762 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); Gulf South
Enters., Inc. v. Delta Materials Operating Co., Inc., 137 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Wilson
Sporting Goods Co. v. Alwes, 21 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
110. 189 So. 342.
Id. at 347-48. The court's conclusion that consideration existed for the promise was not
111.
well-reasoned, but, for the purposes of this agency discussion, the important point is that the court
was dealing with a promise that it considered to be binding.
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also for his brother's share because he had acted without authority in purporting
to bind his brother to help pay his mother's indebtedness. Citing Civil Code
articles 3010, 3012 and 3013, along with a couple of earlier decisions, the court
said: "It is a well settled principle .of law in this state, that one who acts without
of
authority, or exceeds his authority when purporting to act for or in behalf
1' 2
another, is personally bound to fulfill the terms of the contract made.
Several other Louisiana decisions have followed essentially the same theory
as Vordenbaumen.13 These cases typically cite Civil Code article 3010 and
appear to assume that such liability arises automatically, much as the commonlaw warranty liability arises, without any showing that the agent affirmatively
misled the third party in some way.
The seminal authority for the other line of cases, those emphasizing the
nonliability of an agent, is a 1928 Louisiana Supreme Court decision, A. Lorenze
Co. v. Wilbert."4 Language in that opinion, taken out of context, has been
recited in several later cases' 5 in a way that suggests that a warranty-style

112. Id. at 348.
113. Vales v. Doley, 297 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (citing Article 3010 and holding
real estate broker personally liable on real estate purchase agreement resulting from broker's
unauthorized offer in purchaser's name); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Gunn, 286 So. 2d 404 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1973)(citing Article 3010 and holding wife personally liable for purchases made without
authority on estranged husband's charge account); Nationwide Fin. Co. v. Pitre, 243 So. 2d 326 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1971) (husband not liable on note on which his wife had forged his signature; any
recovery had to be obtained from wife); Cooley v. Al Hirt Enters., Inc., 180 So. 2d 841 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1965) (plaintiff should be allowed to amend petition against purported principals, who denied
providing authority for the purchase of two paintings, to include a claim against the purported agent
of the principals for exceeding his authority); Fontenot v. Fontenot, 175 So. 2d 910, 912 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1965) (that disclosed agents become personally bound by contracts that they execute without
adequate authority is "a legal proposition so clear as to require no citation of authority beyond the
codal articles"); Opelousas-St. Landry Bank & Trust Co. v. Bruner, 13 La. App. 337, 125 So. 507
(La. App. Ist Cir. 1929) (brother who purported to buy property for himself and as agent for brother,
but without adequate authority, bound only himself, and so became the sole owner of the property).
114. A. Lorenze Co. v. Wilbert, 165 La. 247, 115 So. 475 (1928). A few earlier cases had made
similar pronouncements, but Lorenze became the authority recited in most of the more recent cases.
As in Lorenze, the exculpatory language in these older cases can be read either narrowly, imposing
liability for exceeding authority except where the agent exhibited his powers or the third party knew
the pertinent facts, or broadly, suggesting that an agent is not liable without affirmative misrepresentations. See Succession of Aiken, 144 La. 64, 70, 80 So. 200, 202 (1918) (contract by executor of
succession that purported to bind estate to pay lawyer a legal fee in connection with the administration of the succession was beyond the authority of an executor and not binding on the succession,
but executor was not personally liable for exceeding his authority because lawyer "knew as well as
[the executor] that the [executor] had no authority; all the facts and surrounding circumstances
attending the transaction being equally well known by each of the parties."); Barry v. Pike, 21 La.
Ann. 221 (1869) (agent is held liable for exceeding authority on misrepresentation theory; agent is
not liable if the limitations of the agent's authority were known to the third party); Trastour v. Fallon,
12 La. Ann. 25, 28 (1857) (agents not liable to third party unless they contracted in their personal
capacities or unless "they misled him [the third party] by assuming to act for others without sufficient
authority.").
115. Tedesco v. Gentry Dev., Inc., 521 So. 2d 717, 725 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988), affd, 540 So.
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theory of liability is incorrect. According to the source passage, "It is well
settled that one who contracts as the agent for another is not bound personally
authority,
if it develops that he exceeded his authority or acted without' 1legal
6
unless the other party to the contract was misled or deceived."
If this "deception" passage were taken as an accurate statement of the law,
it would mean that an agent would not be liable under Louisiana law for
exceeding his authority in the typical transaction, where nothing was said about
authority one way or the other. Unless the agent had affirmatively deceived the
third party in some way, he would not be liable to the third party merely for
exceeding his authority. In common-law terminology, the agent would not be
deemed to have warranted his authority; he would be liable only for misrepresentations of authority. In effect, a third party would bear the same risk as an agent
in misinterpreting the agent's authority, even though the agent would normally
be in the better position to know the pertinent facts concerning the limits of his
authority.
It is doubtful that Lorenze really meant what this one passage seems to
suggest, any more than Vordenbaumen meant to suggest that agents could never
avoid personal liability if they acted beyond their authority. The trouble with the
cases in this area is that they tend to exaggerate the legal rules that they recite.
The results in the cases, as distinguished from the recited rules, are not so
surprising and generally can be reconciled.
Properly interpreted, Lorenze simply held that when the law and facts are
equally available (or equally known) by both the agent and third party, agency
law does not shift the risks of formal legal defects in the authorization under
which the agent purports to act from the third party to the agent." 7 The

2d 960 (1989); Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Viser, 140 So. 2d 762, 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962); Gulf
South Enters., Inc. v. Delta Materials Operating Co., Inc., 137 So. 2d 427 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962);
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Alwes, 21 So. 2d 102, 103 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
116. A. Lorenze Co., 165 La. at 255, 115 So. at 478.
117. The third party in Lorenze was a corporate affiliate of the maker of the note; both
corporations had the same president, a Mr. A. Lorenze. Because of this overlap in office-holdings,
Mr. Lorenze had asked the vice president of the debtor corporation to sign the note so that a note
payable to the A. Lorenze Co. would not be signed by Mr. A. Lorenze himself, as president of the
debtor corporation. The signing of the note had been authorized explicitly by a resolution of the
board of directors of the maker corporation. The only defect in the vice president's authority was
a technical one. The board resolution had been adopted at a meeting held outside of Louisiana, and
under the law in effect at the time, the location of the meeting rendered the resolution invalid.
It seems obvious that the agent in Lorenze knew nothing that the president of the third party
corporation did not know, and may even have been acting in accordance with this common
president's instructions. The common president knew every fact that he needed to know to assess
for himself the authority with which the vice president purported to act. If the agent did not actually
"exhibit his powers" (i.e., show the president the board resolution), then surely the president had, in
Planiol's words, "sufficient knowledge" concerning the resolutions to access for himself the authority
with which the corporate agent purported to act. The agent was in no better position than the third
party to know the requirements of the law concerning the adoption of resolutions by Louisianachartered, Louisiana-domiciled corporations.
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following passage from Lorenze captures the spirit of the case much better than
the "deception" excerpt quoted earlier:
If [the third party] was fully informed of the facts, by virtue of which
the party acting as agent for another claimed authority to represent the
other party, the party acting as agent is not bound personally if he
exceeds his authority or if it develops that the supposed authority was
invalid."' s
Most of the later cases in the Lorenze line of cases may be explained in
similar terms. Two of them dealt with transactions in which the third party was
fully informed concerning the relevant facts, and might even have known more
than the agent." 9 Another' 20 dealt with the consequences of a formal legal
defect in the agent's authority,' and not with any special knowledge held by
the agent concerning
the limits of his authority or the existence or competence
22
of his principal.

For other similar holdings, see Succession of Aiken, 144 La. 64, 80 So. 200 (1918); Tedesco, 521
So. 2d at 717; Brashears v. Milner, 64 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953).
118. Lorenze, 115 So. at 478.
119. Buckley v. Woodlawn Dev. Corp., 233 La. 662, 98 So. 2d 92 (1957); Brashears, 64 So.
2d at 519.
120. Tedesco, 521 So. 2d at 717. Compare Tedesco with Tulane Educ. Fund's Adm'rs v.
Baccich & DeMontluzin, 129 La. 469, 56 So. 371 (1911) (agents held personally liable to third party
for purporting to sell options on land to him without written authority to do so, requiring the third
party optionee to negotiate with owner for a purchase at a higher price; court did not believe agents'
allegations that they had "exhibited their powers" by explaining that they did not currently have the
necessary authority, but hoped later to acquire it). Three other cases might also be placed in the
Tedesco "legal defect" category: Buckley, 233 La. at 662, 98 So. 2d at 92, Succession of Aiken, 144
La. at 64, 80 So. at 200, and Brashears, 64 So. 2d at 519. However, the defects in Buckley were not
purely formal, and regardless of the nature of the defect, the third parties in all three of the other
cases were fully aware of the facts that suggested a lack of lawful authority. Thus, it is not clear
whether the defendants won in these cases because agents are not deemed to warrant the law, or
because the third parties happened to know all the pertinent facts.
121. Tedesco, 521 So. 2d at 717 (lack of written authority to sign contract to sell immovable
property). See Brashears, 64 So. 2d at 519 (need for court approval for sale of property of
succession).
122. In contrast to some other cases in which the third party was fully aware that certain legal
requirements had not been fulfilled (Succession ofAiken, 144 La. at 64, 80 So. at 200, and Brashears,
64 So. 2d at 519), it was not clear in Tedesco, 521 So. 2d at 717, whether either the agent or the
third party knew about the applicable legal requirement, i.e., that authority to sign contracts to sell
immovable property had to be in writing. Arguably, the agent was in a better position than the third
party in this case to know, or to find out, whether the legal requirement of a writing had been
satisfied. Nevertheless, without regard to the relative knowledge of the parties on this point, the
Tedesco court concluded that it was unreasonable as a matter of law for a third party simply to
assume that the necessary authority existed without actually seeing it in writing. In effect, the agent
was allowed to assert the same defense as the principal-the contract was unenforceable due to the
lack of written authority.
The point of Tedesco on this issue seemed similar to that in Lorenze: all parties may be presumed
to know the law. If the law makes certain actions unenforceable in the absence of specified
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Another case of the Lorenze line of cases quotes the "deception" passage in
dealing with an entirely moot point, the liability of the agent to the third party
for transactions that the court had found to be binding on the principal.' 23 Still
another case, Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Alwes,' 24 uses Lorenze merely to
change the grounds for a judgment in favor of a defendant agent so that the
agent's case against the third party for an abuse of rights would appear to be
stronger. 125
If one examines the actual holdings rather than stated rationales of these
cases, one sees that the pattern of results is very close to what one would expect
under the Restatement (Second) of Agency: an agent is normally understood to
warrant his authority, but may avoid liability for violating this warranty of
authority if the facts and circumstances suggest either that the agent manifested

formalities, then third parties, the parties seeking to enforce these transactions, must themselves be
held responsible for a failure to see to the fulfillment of the requirements. Otherwise, the
requirements themselves will be weakened through the allowance of recoveries against agents for
transactions that could not be enforced against the principals themselves.
One may criticize the very idea that a principal should be entitled to assert purely formal defenses
to transactions that are fully, though informally, authorized. But if purely formal defenses are to be
honored, it is important not to let the third party hold the agent hostage to a waiver of the defense.
Principals should not be held to assert their legal defenses only on pain of rendering their innocent
agents personally liable as a result. If a principal's assertion of a formality-based defense is really
going to be effective, the same defense will have to be extended to the agent. Third parties who
ignore legally-required formalities will have to be treated, as they were in Tedesco, as proceeding at
their own risk.
123. Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Viser, 140 So. 2d 762, 766 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
124. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. Alwes, 21 So. 2d 102 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945).
125. The agent in Aiwes, who was a principal of a high school, had been sued personally to
collect amounts owed to the plaintiff third party in connection with the agent's ordering athletic
equipment for his school. The defendant agent had reconvened against the plaintiff, alleging damage
to his reputation and good name caused by the filing of the suit against him.
The Alwes trial court dismissed the reconventional demand. However, after a trial in which the
plaintiff had apparently tried to prove that the agent had acted without disclosing his agency capacity
and/or had acted beyond his authority, the jury found in favor of the defendant, and the trial court
entered judgment for the defendant based on the jury verdict. The defendant agent wished to have
the basis for the judgment in his favor changed to a dismissal on grounds of no cause or right of
action, apparently so that he could strengthen 'his appeal of the trial court's dismissal of his
reconventional demand.
Alwes was hardly a good test of the Lorenze dictum. Not only was the Lorenze rule unnecessary
to the result in the case, but also it was being recited, after a full jury trial, with the knowledge that
no acts in excess of the agent's authority really had occurred. Lorenze was used in Alwes not to
resolve a genuine dispute between an agent and a third party about misunderstood authority, but to
make the third party's suit against the agent, on grounds later determined to be insufficient, seem
even less reasonable than the jury verdict alone might have suggested. It is not clear why the
appellate court decided to be so hostile to the creditor's collection efforts in this case (perhaps a suit
against a high school principal personally to collect for athletic equipment that obviously had been
ordered for his school struck the court as much too aggressive), but it is clear that the court did not
have before it the type of dispute that the Lorenze rule really purports to resolve.
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his intention not to make such a warranty, or that the third party knew about the
risks of authority anyway, from some other source.
C. Mislabeled Exceeding-Authority Cases
Unfortunately, many of the Louisiana cases that discuss an agent's liability
for exceeding his authority are not mandate cases at all, but tort cases. 126 For
example, in Dupre v. Marquis,'27 a lawyer and his client were accused of
defaming a physician by naming him as a defendant in a medical malpractice
action. In analyzing the lawyer's responsibility for this alleged defamation, the
Dupre court pointed out that the relationship between a lawyer and client was
one of principal and agent. The court then recited mandate law to the effect that
agents may be held liable for their unauthorized acts, and noted that the client
had told his lawyer that he could not recall having been treated by the plaintiff
physician at all. The court treated this statement as an implicit withholding of
authority to sue this particular physician, and held the lawyer subject to
128
defamation liability because he had exceeded his authority.
The Dupre reasoning misses the mark. Properly speaking, the law of
mandate governs primarily the requirements for, and the binding effects of, a
mandatary's juridical acts in the name and on behalf of his principal. It also
deals with the relations between the principal and mandatary, and with the
consequences of a mandatary's professing to bind his principal through juridical
acts that he is not really authorized to perform. However, mandate law does not
purport to consider whether an agent's conduct should be considered tortious or
whether a principal should be held vicariously liable for his agent's allegedly
tortious conduct.
Nothing in mandate law says that principals have the power to immunize
their agents against tort liability for conduct that would otherwise be considered
tortious, merely by authorizing it. 29 Nor does mandate law say that an agent's
conduct is automatically tortious just because it is unauthorized. Thus, an agent

126. Sondes v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 501 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); Dupre v.
Marquis, 467 So. 2d 65 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 472 So. 2d 38 (1985); Naulty v. OUPAC,
Inc., 448 So. 2d 1322 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1984); Navratil v. Smart, 400 So., 2d 268 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 405 So. 2d 320 (1981).
127. Dupre, 467 So. 2d at 65.
128. Id. at 68. Ultimately, the lawyer was not held liable because the defamation action against
him had prescribed. Id. at 69. For a case with similar reasoning and a ruling in favor of a lawyer
who acted in an authorized manner see Sondes, 501 So. 2d at 829.
129. An agent's duties to protect his principal's interests through authorized conduct might be
taken into account in determining whether, on balance, the agent's behavior should be considered
tortious. See 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989) (corporate officer is
privileged to cause his corporation to breach its contracts to the extent that his conduct is authorized
and reasonably thought by the officer to be in the best interest of the corporation). Nevertheless, the
mere presence or absence of a principal's authorization of some specified conduct does not, in and
of itself, determine whether that conduct is tortious.
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would be liable for battery if he beat up a troublesome customer, even if the
beating was administered strictly in accordance with his principal's authorizations, and, conversely, an agent would not be liable to a third party for the tort
of "exceeding authority" if he told a troublesome customer to go shop someplace
else, in violation of his principal's explicit instructions to the contrary. The
authority rules of mandate law simply have nothing to say on these sorts of
questions. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained,
Civil Code article 2985 et seq., titled "Of Mandate," define the nature
of the contractual relationship and the obligation of the parties under a
mandate, but do not attempt to fix liability for the tortious acts of a
mandatary."'
Although it may sometimes be true that an agent who is committing a tort
is also exceeding his authority, the liability that the agent incurs because of his
tort is still tort liability, not the "exceeding-authority" liability that some of the
Louisiana cases say that it is. The agents in the mislabeled tort cases are not
being held liable merely because their unauthorized actions failed to bind their
principals under mandate law, but rather because their acts, authorized or not,
were tortious.
A true exceeding-authority case is different from a case in which an agent's
action is tortious in and of itself. Under mandate law, an agent is held liable for
exceeding his authority for the simple reason that his acts in the name of his
principal have failed to bind the principal as the agent had warranted or
represented that they would. His acts need not be tortious in any other sense.
It is the failure to bind the principal that is at the heart of the "exceedingauthority" liability imposed by mandate law. If the principal ends up bound by
the agent's unauthorized acts (through apparent authority, for example), then
under mandate law the third party has no claim against the agent for exceeding
his authority. 3'
Consider the Dupre case once again. Had Dupre been a true exceedingauthority case under mandate law, the libeled physician would have been suing
the lawyer because the lawyer had failed to obtain from the client some truly
binding libelous remarks that the physician had been seeking. The physician

130. Blanchard v. Ogima, 253 La. 34, 39-40, 215 So. 2d 902, 904 (1968). See also Rowell v.
Carter Mobile Homes, Inc., 500 So. 2d 748, 751 (La. 1987). In both of the cited cases, the court
made its remark about the scope of the mandate articles in the context of explaining that a principal
is not liable for the physical torts of his nonservant agents.
131. See Item Co. v. LaPlace Chamber of Commerce, 16 So. 2d 567 (La. App. Orl. 1944) (if
agent is liable to third party for exceeding authority, then principal bears no liability for those
unauthorized acts, and if principal is liable, then agent cannot be, unless he guaranteed the contract
personally); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 329, cmt. f (1958) (common law rule that agent is
not liable to third party for exceeding his authority if the principal nevertheless becomes a party to
the contract). Of course, where the agent has exceeded his authority but the principal has
nevertheless become bound, the principal may have a claim against the agent.
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would have been disappointed when, contrary to the lawyer's representations, it
turned out that the lawyer really had no authority to commit his client to make
the sorts of libelous statements that the physician had been promised. What
really happened, of course, was exactly the reverse: the lawyer provided some
libelous remarks that were fully effective as libel in and of themselves, without
regard to whether they were binding on the client, and the physician responded
by suing the lawyer and client for defamation.
The confusion that arises between tort law and agency law is understandable
in the Dupre type of case, for tort law does recognize doctrines that are similar
to those of mandate law in some sense. Tort law does sometimes permit one
person's actions to be attributed to another if those actions could be deemed to
have been intended (i.e., "authorized") by the alleged tortfeasor, or to be within
the scope of risks covered by some duty of care applicable to the tortfeasor (e.g.,
a duty of careful supervision) to prevent injuries caused by the conduct of others.
However, the policies that control the true mandate law cases have little or
nothing to do with the myriad policies that should control the development of
indirect or vicarious responsibility for quasi-delictual obligations under tort law.
Authority doctrines in mandate law are designed to resolve and allocate the risks
of misunderstandings that arise in connection with the juridical acts of the
parties, not their delictual or quasi-delictual acts. Hence, the mislabeled
"exceeding-authority" cases in Louisiana should be interpreted as inartfullyexplained tort cases. They should not be considered controlling, or even
influential, in resolving true mandate law issues.
VI. TORT LIABILITY GENERALLY

Corporation law protects shareholders from personal liability for tort
obligations in the same way that it protects them from liability for contract debts.
It creates a legally separate and distinct person that essentially substitutes for the
true human owners in the roles that they might otherwise play as the direct
proprietors or partners in the business. Any liability that would otherwise be
imposed on the shareholders in their ownership capacities, i.e., as principals on
corporate contracts or as liability-bearing masters for the torts of corporate
employees, is instead imposed on the legally-distinct corporation. As long as the
corporation's separate personality is respected, i.e., its veil is not pierced,
shareholders will not bear any liability for these obligations because they are
considered to be the obligations of some other, separate person-the corporation.
The effects of the separate personality theory are not unlimited, however.
Separate personality means that corporate debts are not treated as personal debts
of the corporation's shareholders, but it does not mean that shareholders or other
corporate participants have immunity from personal liability for their own
personal torts. A shareholder has no more right to commit a tort for a separate
corporate person than he has to commit the same tort for himself or others.
Absent immunity, justification, or privilege, if the conduct is tortious, then the
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tortfeasor is personally liable.

The fact that the tortfeasor happens to be a

corporate shareholder, officer, agent, or employee is irrelevant.132
The
participants in an incorporated business need insurance against their own personal
tort liability just as much as the participants in an unincorporated business need
this sort of protection.
Still, it is a bit too easy simply to say that any individual, regardless of his
corporate position, is always liable for his own personal torts. If one simply
assumes that the alleged tortfeasor has indeed committed a tort then certainly he
is liable. The more difficult question is whether the conduct of the corporate
participant should be considered tortious in the first place.
Certainly, if a corporate officer, driving a corporate automobile on corporate
business, negligently runs a stop sign and strikes a pedestrian who is lawfully in
the intersection, then that officer has violated his personal tort duty to operate the
automobile with due regard for the safety of pedestrians. However, if the same
officer "negligently" lets one of the corporation's contracts sit idle on his desk
for several months, or "negligently" ships inferior goods in his efforts to fulfill
the contract, then the law cannot treat these instances of personal carelessness as
if they were personal torts by the corporate officer without overriding normal
principles of contract and agency law, which are designed to protect the officer
from liability. If a "negligent" failure to cause someone else to fulfill his
contracts is itself considered a personal tort on the part of the "negligent" party,
then the "negligent" employee or agent will become liable, in effect, for the
breach of a contract to which he is not 133
supposed to be a party and for which he
is not supposed to be personally liable.

132.
Corporate officers and agents have been held personally liable for:
1) Their personal fraud: Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. American Chem., Inc., 461 So. 2d
1063 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), affd, 480 So. 2d 730 (1986); Dolese Concrete Co. v.
Tessitore, 357 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 359 So. 2d 620, 623 (1978);
2) Their personal negligence resulting in personal injury: Canter v. Koehring Co., 283
So. 2d 716 (La. 1973);
3) Their personal negligence resulting in accidental physical damage to corporeal
property: United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Ledford, 244 So. 2d 252 (La. App. 3d
Cir.), writdenied, 246 So. 2d 681 (1971). Accord H.B. "Buster" Hughes, Inc. v. Bernard,
318 So. 2d 9 (La. 1975) (indicating that such liability was possible, but finding it not to
exist in the case before it).
The supreme court has also indicated that acourt could impose liability on an officer or agent who,
without proper justification, intentionally interferes with a contract betveen his corporation and a
third party, but the court did not actually impose liability under the facts of the case before it. 9 to
5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 538 So. 2d 228 (La. 1989).
133. Asking whether an officer should be held liable for his own "negligent" behavior begs the
question of whether the officer owed some duty to protect the interest in question. He is liable if he
was not careful in protecting an interest that he owed a duty of care to protect, but the question
remains whether the officer owed the duty in the first place. Tort law has never attempted to protect
all forms of interest from damage of all types from all persons. Private parties have always enjoyed
considerable freedom to determine for themselves, as a matter of contract law, the special duties that
they wish to undertake in their consensual dealings with one another. Duties to guard against
accidental bodily injury or physical property damage have traditionally been considered part of the
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The drawing of boundaries between tort and contract law should determine
the outcome of most "officer tort" cases. If the officer has breached a duty
traditionally 'imposed by tort law, he should be held personally liable for the
damages that his breach of duty has caused. But if his "negligence" has
consisted merely of failing to work hard enough to fulfill his corporate
principal's contractual obligations, then he should not be deemed to have
committed a tort personally. His contractual status as a corporate agent should
be recognized, and the duties to perform the contract should be imposed only on
the parties to the contract.
Of course, there may be cases in the future in which the courts will choose
to expand the tort duties traditionally recognized in connection with the
negotiation and performance of corporate contracts. Duties of this kind are not
inconceivable, either technically or as a matter of policy, and some limited duties
(such as the duty not to deceive the other party) are already recognized.
However, when any proposed new duty is being considered, courts should
recognize that the imposition of a personal tort duty on a corporate officer
necessarily interferes with the contracting principals' freedom to use their officers
or employees strictly as agents-persons who can help the principals negotiate
and perform their contracts without bearing any personal liability. Sometimes
this type of judicial interference with freedom of contract might be justified (as
in the case of fraud or deceit), but usually it is not.' 34
For a brief period in the mid- to late eighties, some Louisiana courts had
indeed approved some broad new "tort" theories of liability that would have
made active corporate shareholders, officers, and employees personally liable to
corporate creditors for their negligent failure to see to it that the corporation

law of torts, but the duty to protect a contract obligee's economic interests in the performance of its
contracts has generally been left to contract law, with little intervention by tort law. Subject to a few
aberrational cases decided in the mid-eighties, Louisiana courts have strongly rejected the tort of
negligent interference with contract. See infra notes 135 and 153.
134. Two competent business persons, negotiating about the risks associated with a particular
transaction, should be able to decide for themselves, in a legally-enforceable way and without judicial
interference, how they wish to allocate the risks they see. They should not be forced by the courts
to accept a deal in which their agents' tort duties to monitor or supervise their contract performances
as principals may cause the agents to behave in uneconomically risk-averse ways. When a court is
called upon to impose contract-related tort duties beyond those traditionally recognized, it should
realize that the tort duties that it is being asked to impose are requested precisely because they will
modify, perhaps inexpertly and unfairly, the deal that the contracting parties themselves had
considered appropriate. If the contract itself could be interpreted to contain the duties claimed by
the plaintiff, then the plaintiff's arguments could be made under a contract theory. While contract
and tort arguments are often made in the alternative, a rejection of the contract argument (or a failure
by one of the parties to make such an argument), followed by an acceptance of the tort argument,
necessarily means that the court is imposing some legal duty on the parties that the court has found
not to be a part of their agreement, either expressly or tacitly. Rarely will such a judicially-imposed
modification of the contract be justified in dealing with the purely commercial relations between the
contracting parties.
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performed its contracts.'35 Fortunately, however, the trend now seems to have

been reversed, and the more recent decisions are rejecting the theory that a
corporate employee owes some tort duty to corporate creditors to exercise due
care to cause the corporation to meet its contractual obligations. The only
"tortious breach" theories that seem to have survived are those associated with

professional malpractice, where privity of contract requirements have been
relaxed to allow affected third parties to sue the negligent professional, and those
involving intentional interference with contract. Professional malpractice issues
are outside the scope of this work. Intentional interference with contract is
discussed in the next section.
A. Tortious Interference with Contract
For many years, Louisiana was the only state in the country that refused to
recognize any form of tortious interference with contract. One supreme court
justice had hinted on several occasions in the early to mid-eighties that the court
might be persuaded to change the law in an appropriate case, 36 but it was not
until 1989, in a difficult and surprising setting, that the change finally came.
The source of the change was one of several reported cases involving efforts
by creditors of the insolvent New Orleans World's Fair corporation to hold the
chief executive officer of the corporation (and his director and officer insurer)
personally liable in connection with various Fair-related corporate transactions. 37 The plaintiff in the case, a uniform supplier to the Fair, convinced

135. Compare 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney, 520 So. 2d 1276 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988), rev'd,
538 So. 2d 228 (1989); Hemphill-Kunstler-Buhler, Auctioneers & Appraisers v. Davis Wholesale
Elecs. Supply Co., 516 So. 2d 402 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 751 (1988), later
appeal, 555 So. 2d 4 (La. App. IstCir. 1989), writ denied, 558 So. 2d 571 (1990); Scariano Bros.,
Inc. v. Hammond Constr., 428 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (imposing breach-of-contract-like
liability under a personal tort theory) with Bergman v. Nicholson Mgt. and Consultants, Inc., 594 So.
2d 491 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 646 (1992); Fine Iron Works v. Louisiana World
Exposition, Inc., 472 So. 2d 201 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 477 So. 2d 104 (1985); Donnelly
v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982); Unimobil 84, Inc. v. Spumey, 797 F.2d 214 (5th
Cir. 1986) (rejecting liability on this ground). For a discussion and criticism of these cases, see
Glenn G. Morris, Business Associations, 50 La. L. Rev. 211 (1989).
136. Justice Lemmon mentioned the point in published opinions or writ denials at least three
times. See PPG Industries, Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1059 n.l (La. 1984) (Although
the intentional interference issue was not posed in the case before it,
the court found that "[tihere is
considerable sentiment for permitting recovery in Louisiana for intentional interference with contracts,
such as by the deliberate inducing of breach of contract."); Sanborn v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 448
So. 2d 91, 95 (La. 1984) (Lemmon, J., concurring with majority on abuse of rights theory, but
"tending to the view that the petitioners sufficiently stated a claim for intentional interference with
contractual relations..."); Moss v. Guarisco, 412 So. 2d 540 (La. 1982) (Lemmon, J., dissenting
from denial of writs; "[Tlhis denial does not necessarily mean that a majority of this court still
subscribes to the theory that there is no cause of action in Louisiana for tortious interference with a
contract.").
137. Other reported cases include Dutton & Vaughn, Inc. v. Spurney, 496 So. 2d 1126 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1986), writ denied, 501 So. 2d 208 (1987); Fine Iron Works, 472 So. 2d at 201; and
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both the trial and the appellate court to impose personal liability on the
executive, Peter Spurney, on the theory that Spurney had committed some kind
of personal tort in his dealings with the creditor. The "tort" was said to be
Spurney's failure-perhaps through simple negligence, perhaps as part of some
unexplained "personal vendetta"-to see to it that the plaintiff in the case, a
uniform supplier to the Fair, received accurate information from the Fair
concerning the number of uniforms to be required. As a result of this tortious
personal failure on Spurney's part, the lower courts reasoned, the uniform
supplier had ordered too much material, and so had expended more than it
should have in connection with138
its work for the Fair. Hence, Spurney was liable
for the excess in expenditures.
At the supreme court level, the majority opinion declined even to state, much
less examine, the theories that the lower courts had utilized. The reasoning in
the courts below was characterized as "unclear"'139 and "loosely associated with
several legal theories. ' "'4 Similarly, the plaintiff's arguments were construed
as little more than a plea for relief of some kind, under whatever theory seemed
appropriate. "'
Facing these purportedly incomprehensible rulings and arguments, the
supreme court determined that what the plaintiff was really seeking, apparently
without realizing it, was a remedy for tortious interference with contract. So
construed, the plaintiff's position was said to require the court to reexamine the
traditional bar against such suits in Louisiana. 4 ' Following this reexamination,
the court concluded that the old absolute bar against all forms of tortious
interference suits should be lifted, and that at least some limited form of tortious
interference claim should be recognized. However, cautioned the court,
It is not our intention ...to adopt whole and undigested the fully
expanded common law doctrine of interference with contract, consisting
of "a rather broad and undefined tort in which no specific conduct is
proscribed and in which liability turns on the purpose for which the
defendant acts, with the indistinct notion that the purposes must be
143
considered improper in some undefined way."'

Unimobil 84, Inc., 797 So. 2d at 214.
138. 9 to 5 Fashions, 520 So. 2d at 1276.
139. 9 to 5 Fashions, 538 So. 2d at 230.
140. Id. at 231.
141. Id.
142. "In effect," the court said, "without labeling the delict, [the plaintiff] urges this court to
recognize an action that it has refused to allow since 1902, viz., an action for tortious interference
with a contractual relationship. We must [therefore] reexamine the basic precepts of our delictual
law in the light of modem conditions ....
" Id. Three of the justices refused to join in the opinion,
but concurred in the result. One of the concurring justices criticized the decision even to take up the
issue of tortious interference with contract under the facts of the case before it. Id. at 235 (Marcus,
J., concurring).
143. Id. at 234 (quoting William L. Prosser & W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law
of Torts § 129, at 979 (5th ed. 1984)).
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The court then outlined these elements of the tort that it was prepared to
recognize:
(1) the existence of a contract or a legally protected interest between the
plaintiff and the corporation; (2) the corporate officer's knowledge of
the contract; (3) the officer's intentional inducement or causation of the
corporation to breach the contract or his intentional rendition of its
performance impossible or more burdensome; (4) absence of justification on the part of the officer; (5) causation of damages to the plaintiff
by the breach of contract or difficulty of its performance brought about
by the officer.'
Strangely, however, after describing the elements of the new tort, the court
concluded that the required new elements had not been satisfied in the case
presented. 4 The court had thus taken the initiative to reexamine a rule of law
that the lower courts had not mentioned, about a tort that had not occurred, and
then had changed the law to the extent necessary to permit recovery for the type
46
of tort that might have occurred in the case had the facts just been different.
The supreme court's decision in 9 to 5 seemed to have much less to do with
correcting errors in the case actually before it than with the court's desire to
write some new law in the area of tortious interference with contracts. Had the
court been concerned merely with exonerating the defendants, it could easily
have reversed the lower courts on the legal theories actually presented and
considered. That the court chose to consider yet another theory under which the
defendants were not liable (undoubtedly the defendants were not liable under all
kinds of other theories) suggests that the court had something to say on this
particular theory that its normal set of cases was just not letting it say. Hence,
in reviewing a case that might have been argued as a tortious interference case,
the majority in 9 to 5 seemed to see a choice between deciding the case on the
issues argued below, with perhaps another tortious interference hint to future
litigants, and reinterpreting the arguments in a way that allowed the court finally
to reach the tortious interference issue in the case before it. Seemingly impatient
for change, the court took the latter course and produced a decision that appeared
designed to provide a new foundation for tortious interference analysis in
Louisiana.
Unfortunately, 9 to 5 was far from an ideal case for establishing this sort of
conceptual foundation. In contrast to the usual tortious interference problem, in
which some genuinely separate third party is alleged to have interfered in the

144. 9 to 5 Fashions,Inc., 538 So. 2d at 234.
145. Id. at 235.
146. The change in the law made by 9 to 5 was more in the nature of rule-making than
adjudication, so that, in contrast to most case-based changes in the law, the change was not
accompanied by any concrete example of how the change was to be applied in a real case. The
change remained purely an abstraction, so the scope of the change was difficult to determine.
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contractual relations existing between two other genuinely separate persons, 47
the 9 to 5 case posed the problem of a fictionally separate person, a corporation,
breaching its own contract in the only way that it could possibly do so, through
some act or omission by one of its own officers or agents.
The supreme court faced real difficulties in using this type of case to change
tortious interference law. The court had to recognize a possibility of tortious
interference in the peculiar context of an officer's acts or omissions in connection
with his own corporation's contracts; otherwise, the old law would not have to
be reconsidered. Yet the court could not let the new tort be so defined that
every breach of contract by a corporation would become a tort by the
corporation's officers or agents, or lead these corporate officers and agents to
believe that their traditional, legally-mandated loyalties to the corporation's
interests were now supposed to be tempered by their competing "tortious
interference" duties to the corporation's various creditors.
The court adopted a twofold solution to the problem it faced. First, it
recognized only a narrow version of tortious interference, requiring intentional
interference with a known contract of the corporation.1 48 Second, even within
the confines of this narrow version of the tort, it treated interference as
"justified" or "privileged" if it was carried out by an officer within the scope of
his authority, 4 9 and in the reasonable belief that his acts were for the benefit
of the corporation (or without knowledge that the acts were adverse to the best
interests of the corporation). 50 "Justification" was not described as an

147. See Prosser & Keeton. supra note 143, § 129, at 982-89 (describing various types of
tortious interference); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 & cmts. (1977). But see Annotation,
Corporate Officer's Liability for.Tortious Interference with Contracts of Corporation, 72 A.L.R. 4th
492 (listing cases in which tortious interference theory is used against officers of the breaching
corporation, principally in connection with employment disputes).
148. 9 to 5 Fashions, Inc. v. Spurney. 538 So. 2d 228, 234 (La. 1989).
149. If the court's authority language were to be interpreted literally and technically, many
officers of small business corporations might be held liable even for good faith acts on behalf of the
corporation that were not properly authorized in accordance with the corporation statute. A technical
approach to the authority issue does not seem appropriate, however, for it seems unlikely that the
supreme court really intended to impose tortious interference liability on a corporate officer for
conduct that in any other context would be considered authorized. Particularly in a small business
corporation, actions are often taken on behalf of the corporation without formal authority of any kind.
If this type of informal authority is sufficient in other contexts, it should be sufficient in the context
of tortious interference law as well.
150. 9 to 5 FashionsC538 So. 2d at 231. Both formulations, reasonable belief in benefits and
lack of knowledge of adverse effects, are set forth in the opinion without any indication as to which
of the two is the controlling test. However, a literal approach to the court's requirement of
"reasonable" belief for the justification of an officer's actions could undermine the broader forms of
managerial discretion traditionally recognized under the business judgment rule. See Watkins v.
North Am. Land & Timber Co., 107 La. 107, 113-14, 31 So. 683, 686-87 (1902); Bordelon v.
Cochrane, 533 So. 2d 82, 86-87 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So. 2d 1255 (1989);
American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance § 4.01 (Proposed Final Draft, 1992).
The officer could become liable to the third party under the "reasonable" belief standard for actions
that normally would be considered within His lawful discretion as far as the corporation was
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affirmative defense, to be pled and proven by the defendant officer. Rather,
"absence of justification" was listed as one of the elements of the plaintiff's
5
case.1 1
1. Interpreting9 to 5
9 to 5 could be read either narrowly or broadly on two different issues: on
the scope of the new tort and on the scope of the countervailing new privilege,
The first issue, the scope of the tort itself, has received most of the attention in
the lower courts, and that attention has been almost entirely hostile.'52 The

concerned. As a result, in contravention of the paramount importance seemingly attached by the 9
to 5 court to an officer's fiduciary duties to his corporation, his tortious interference duties to a third
party, rather than his corporate duties, would more strongly influence the corporate officer's behavior.
It seems unlikely that the language of 9 to 5 was really intended to have these potentially harmful
implications. The court was concentrating on changing the law of tortious interference with contract,
not with reworking the rules of internal corporate governance. Indeed, the court's "justification"
discussion seemed directed at retaining the traditional rules concerning the fiduciary duties owed by
corporate officers to their corporations. 9 to 5 should therefore be interpreted in a way that preserves
these traditional rules and not in a way that changes them.
151. 9 to 5 Fashions, 538 So. 2d at 234. See Yarbrough v. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n of Jackson,
616 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) (justification not an affirmative defense; lack of justification
an element of plaintiff's cause of action).
152. Gulf South Bus. Sys. and Consultants, Inc. v. La. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 625 So.
2d 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) (defendant lessee's request that lessor purchase certain office
equipment for leased premises from one vendor rather than another was neither intentional nor
unjustified interference with vendor's contract); Belle Pass Terminal, Inc. v. John, Inc., 618 So. 2d
1076 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 626 So. 2d 1172 (1993) (no cause of action for tortious
interferences because no privity of contract); First Downtown Dev. v. Cimochowski, 613 So. 2d 671
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 615 So. 2d 340 (1993) (no interference cause of action stated against
president of lessor medical corporation who caused his corporation to breach its three-year office
lease because of president's decision to move his medical practice to another state); Hampton v. Live
Oak Builders, Inc., 608 So. 2d 225 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992) (no 9 to 5 claim stated against officer
of corporate contractor that was alleged to have constructed defective house; any interference alleged
was privileged under 9 to 5); Carter v. Smith, 607 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992) (uninjured driver
who alleged that she had been fired because of an accident involving her car and a negligentlyoperated school bus was effectively seeking recovery for.negligent interference with contract, a theory
that had been rejected by 9 to 5; Lewis v. Aluminum Co. of Am.. 588 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1991), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 411 (1992), criticized and distinguished); Green v. Beauregard Fed.
Sav. Bank, 604 So. 2d 1351 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 608 So. 2d 153 (1992) (bank officers'
administration of loan commitment by bank to real estate developer was justified within the meaning
of that term in 9 to 5; jury's verdict that officers had tortiously interfered with loan commitment
contract between bank and developer was manifestly erroneous); Greene v. Roy, 604 So. 2d 1359
(La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 607 So. 2d 544 (1992) (9 to 5 did not lift traditional bar against
claim for alienation of affection or create a cause of action for tortious interference with the contract
of marriage); Korson v. Independence Mall 1, Ltd., 595 So. 2d 1174 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992)
(agent/officers of lessor who commenced eviction proceedings against lessees did not tortiously
interfere with lease; officers were justified in their actions by lessees' admitted breaches of the lease);
Everything on Wheels Subaru, Inc. v. Subaru South, Inc., 593 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991),
writ granted, 594 So. 2d 1305 (1992) (no 9 to 5 cause of action stated where complaint contained
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no allegations that acts complained of were intentional, rather than negligent, and where plaintiff
acknowledged in its brief that acts of interference did not affect an existing contract); Lynn v. Berg
Mechanical, Inc., 582 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (alleged interference by corporate officers
with employment of corporate employee was not alleged to have been the cause of the loss of its job,
so no 9 to 5 claim was stated, and 9 to 5 did not create a cause of action for interference by
corporate officers with efforts of former corporate employee to find another job); Chaffin v.
Chambers, 577 So. 2d 1125 (La. App. Ist Cir.), rev'd, 584 So. 2d 665 (1991) (intermediate appellate
court could not recognize tortious interference claim by one lawyer against another lawyer who was
alleged to have induced personal injury client to fire first lawyer and to hire the second, as supreme
court had exclusive power to regulate the legal profession); Butler v. Reeder, 573 So. 2d 1159 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1991) (9 to 5 did not create cause of action for intentional interference with contract
of marriage); Frisard v. Eastover Bank for Say., 572 So. 2d 343 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1990) (allegations
that bank had been negligent in notifying tenant that leased property was to be seized by bank did
not state cause of action under 9 to 5 for interference with contract between landlord and tenant;
negligent interference with contract was not recognized as a tort); Herbert v. Placid Ref. Co., 564 So.
2d 371 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 569 So. 2d 981 (1990) (allegations of negligent drug testing
by laboratory, causing termination of employment contract, did not state a cause of action under 9
to 5; negligent interference with contract was not recognized as a tort); Spencer-Wallington, Inc. v.
Service Merchandise, Inc., 562 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 567 So. 2d 109 (1990)
(reading 9 to 5 in a rather odd way-that the source of an officer's duty to a third party was his
fiduciary relationship to corporation, and finding no such duty was owed by a purchaser of a
corporation to a corporate supplier to refrain from causing the corporation to breach its pre-existing
contract with the supplier); Tallo v. Stroh Brewery Co., 544 So. 2d 452 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 547 So. 2d 355 (1989) (brewery owed no duty to prospective purchaser of beer distributor
not to act unreasonably in withholding its consent to the proposed transfer of ownership); Farrell v.
Boyer, 541 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989) (9 to 5 did not provide a basis for overruling the
Louisiana rule against recognizing a cause of action for alienation of wife's affections). Even the
supreme court itself, in an opinion by Justice Dennis, the author of the 9 to 5 decision, has declined
the invitation to expand 9 to 5 to impose new duties as between primary and excess insurers. Great
Southwest Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 557 So. 2d 966 (La. 1990) (no duty of reasonable care,
or even of good faith, owed by primary insurer to excess insurer).
But see Neel v. Citrus Lands of La., Inc., No. 93-CA-1366, 1993 WL 521208 (La. App. 4th Cir.
Dec. 16, 1993) (narrow reading of 9 to 5 rejected; alleged intentional interference with plaintiff's
employment by another company stated a cause of action); WKG-TV Video Electronic College, Inc.
v. Reynolds, 618 So. 2d 1023 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993) (affirming tortious interference judgment
against corporate officer and shareholder who "manufactur[ed] reasons" to postpone sale of corporate
business to one buyer, due to higher offer from another buyer): Yarbrough v. Federal Land Bank
Ass'n of Jackson, 616 So. 2d 1327 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993) (cause of action stated against bank
officer for alleged interference with former bank debtor's contractual rights of first refusal on land
earlier dationed to bank); Constance v. Jules Albert Constr., Inc., 591 So. 2d 1238 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1991), writ denied, 597 So. 2d 1030 (1992) (successor to mortgagor of condominium property stated
a cause of action under 9 to 5 against corporate officer of corporate mortgagee where he alleged that
the mortgagee's officer had notified prospective purchasers of his condominium that the corporate
mortgagee would exercise approval rights over their purchase of the condominium, even though the
mortgagee had no such rights under the terms of the mortgage; Stroh, 544 So. 2d 452, distinguished);
Colbert v. B.F. Carvin Constr. Co., 600 So. 2d 719 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1309,
1311 (1992) (no cause of action for negligent interference with contract, but under professional
negligence theory, an architect may be liable to building contractor for damages caused to contractor
by his reliance on architect's poorly-drawn plans and specifications); Nehrenz v. Dunn, 593 So. 2d
915 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992) (employee stated cause of action under general negligence law against
drug testing firm that was alleged to have negligently reported a positive result; 9 to 5 rejection of
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hostility has been expressed through three different rules: first, that Louisiana
153
still does not recognize the tort of negligent interference with contract,

negligent interference with contract was no bar to such suit); Lewis, 588 So. 2d 167 (although
negligent interference with contract was not recognized as a tort under 9 to 5, prospective employee
who alleged that his job opportunities and reputation had been injured by a drug-testing laboratory's
negligent, and falsely-positive, urinalysis had stated a cause of action under general tort law principles
of negligence; Herbert, 564 So. 2d 371, distinguished); Jarrell v. Carter, 577 So. 2d 120 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 582 So. 2d 1311 (199 1) (recognizing possible expansion of tortious interference
law from narrow grounds recognized in 9 to 5, but avoiding direct consideration of 9 to 5 issue by
treating the plaintiff's allegations of interference in negotiations for the purchase of beer
distributorship as sufficient to a state cause of action for "unfair trade practices" under La. R.S.
51:1405). But cf. Peacock v. Brightway Signs, Inc., 545 So. 2d 649 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied,
551 So. 2d 636 (1989) (reversing judgment based on pre-9 to 5 law, and remanding for reconsideration in light of that case; nature of alleged tortious interference not reported).
153. Carter, 607 So. 2d 6; Colbert, 600 So. 2d 719; Frisard,572 So. 2d 343; Herbert, 564 So.
2d 371. Despite the perceived reaffirmation of Louisiana's traditional bar against negligent
interference suits, several well-reasoned post-9 to 5 cases have permitted recovery for what amounted
to interference with contract caused by the negligence of the defendant. See Colbert, 600 So. 2d 719
(no cause of action for negligent interference with contract, but under professional negligence theory,
an architect may be liable to building contractor for damages caused to contractor by his reliance on
architect's poorly-drawn plans and specifications); Nehrenz, 593 So. 2d 915 (employee stated cause
of action under general negligence law against drug testing firm that was alleged to have negligently
reported a positive result; 9 to 5 rejection of negligent interference with contract was no bar to such
suit); Lewis, 588 So. 2d 167 (although negligent interference with contract was not recognized as a
tort under 9 to 5, prospective employee who alleged that his job opportunities and reputation had
been injured by a drug-testing laboratory's negligent, and falsely-positive, urinalysis had stated a
cause of action under general tort law principles of negligence). But see Herbert, 564 So. 2d 371
(allegations of negligent drug testing by laboratory, causing termination of employment contract, did
not state a cause of action under 9 to 5; negligent interference with contract was not recognized as
a tort).
These cases suggest that the purported "bar" against negligent interference suits may be overstated.
What the rule against negligent interference suits really rejects is not the recovery of the contractinterference damages that may arise out of the negligence of a defendant (damages for lost earnings
in a personal injury suit compensate the plaintiff for a particular type of contractual interference), but
rather the supposition that a person is negligent merely because he fails to exercise care to protect
all of the contractual interests of all other persons whose contracts may be affected by his behavior.
The law does not impose a general duty to be careful to avoid damage to every contractual interest.
But it may, and does, impose more narrow forms of duties to avoid injury to some interests of some
persons under some circumstances. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058 (La.
1984). Cf Barrie v. V.P. Exterminators, Inc., 625 So. 2d 1007 (La. 1993) (rejecting privity
requirement in negligent misrepresentation action against termite inspector).
Thus, as indicated in the drug testing cases cited above, a duty is imposed by some courts on drugtesting firms to be careful in analyzing the urine samples submitted by the employees of the firm's
clients. Nehrenz, 593 So. 2d 915; Lewis, 588 So. 2d 167. It seems appropriate to impose such a
duty because it should be obvious to the testing firm that erroneously positive results might cost an
employee his job and interfere with his future employment prospects. The employee is not in a
position to negotiate adequate contractual protections against the losses that the testing firm's
negligence might cause him, even though it is principally the employee who will suffer from a
falsely-positive test result. Similarly, though perhaps less compellingly, it may be considered
appropriate to impose a duty of care on an architect for economic losses caused to a contractor as
a result of the architect's negligence in preparing his drawings and specifications. Colbert, 600 So.
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second, that Louisiana still does not recognize the tort of alienation of affection,
or tortious interference with a contract of marriage,'54 and, finally, that
Louisiana still does not recognize a claim for tortious interference brought
against a complete stranger to the contract; only where the defendant is an officer
corporation's contract
or agent of a corporation and has interfered with his own
S
with the plaintiff will a 9 to 5 claim be recognized.' 5
The last rule, allowing claims against officers of one of the contracting
parties and rejecting claims against true third parties, produces something of an
irony. And it is an irony that the supreme court did not likely intend. Under
this interpretation of 9 to 5, Louisiana law now provides tortious interference
protection only to those plaintiffs who have had the opportunity to negotiate
contractual protections against the losses in question (e.g., to get security from
the corporation or personal promises or guarantees from the controlling corporate
officers). It denies protection to the very persons who would seem to need it
most: those having no contractual relationship with the interfering party or with
his employer, and so no opportunity to bargain for appropriate contractual
protections. A recent Fourth Circuit decision rejected this narrow interpretation
of 9 to 5,'5 6 but the narrow interpretation remains the majority view.
The privilege issue has received mixed treatment. In most cases, it has been
used, like the three rules described above, to provide grounds for the rejection
of a tortious interference claim." 7 In two cases, however, the privilege has
been interpreted narrowly enough to allow the plaintiff to recover. In the first
case, Constance v. Jules Albert Construction,Inc.,"'8 an officer of a corporate
mortgagee was held liable for causing his company to assert a purported right of
approval on the sale of the mortgaged property. The court found that no such
right of approval existed, and held that the officer was not privileged to cause his
corporation knowingly to assert a right that it really did not possess.'59 In the

2d 719. The architect knows that the contractor is going to have to rely on those drawings in
constructing the building, even though, in practice, the architect will typically be in privity of contract
only with the owner of the project. The torts recognized in these sorts of cases should be viewed
as particular forms of professional malpractice, where courts recognize the inadequacies of purely
contractual protections. These cases should not be interpreted as imposing a general duty of care on
all persons to avoid interference with all of the contractual interests of all other persons.
154. Greene, 604 So. 2d 1359; Butler, 573 So. 2d 1159; Farrell, 541 So. 2d 398.
155. Belle Pass Terminal, 618 So. 2d 1076; Spencer-Wallington, Inc., 562 So. 2d 1060; Tallo,
544 So. 2d 452. But see Neel, slip op. 93-CA- 1366, 1993 WL 521208 (cause of action stated despite
lack of privity).
156. Neel, slip op. 93-CA-1366, 1993 WL 521208.
157. Hampton, 608 So. 2d 225; Green, 604 So. 2d 1351; Korson, 595 So. 2d 1174.
158. 591 So. 2d 1238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 597 So. 2d 1030 (1992).
159. Id. at 1239. It is not clear whether the court was holding the officer liable merely because
the officer knew that he was imposing the purported contractual requirement, or because he
knowingly imposed the requirement when he knew that the requirement did not exist. At a
minimum, the latter should be required. An officer should be able to take a position on the legal
rights of his corporation, deliberately but in good faith, and to take steps to enforce that position
without risking tort liability if the position is later rejected by a court.
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second case, WKG-TV Video Electronic College, Inc. v. Reynolds,"6 an officer
caused his corporation to begin asserting excuses (later determined to be
unjustified) for terminating a contract with a buyer of the corporation's video
college, so that the college could be sold to another buyer at a higher price.'
The court held that the officer had no privilege under 9 to 5 to act "fraudulently
63
or unethically,"' 62 and affirmed the trial court's imposition of liability.'
It is impossible to tell from the language of the first of these two "narrow
privilege" cases, Constance, whether the officer was simply taking a position,
deliberately but in good faith, concerning his corporation's legal rights, or
whether he was acting in bad faith, as the court concluded about the officer in
the second case. However, some of the language used in Constance suggests
that the court may have been confusing the question of whether the corporation
was "justified" in its actions, in the sense of complying with its contractual
rights, with whether the officer was "justified" in the sense required to treat his
conduct as privileged under 9 to 5.
These two concepts, justified corporate conduct and justified behavior by the
officer, must not be confused if the 9 to 5 privilege is to serve any purpose. To
say that a corporation's conduct in connection with its contract was not
contractually justified is just another way of saying that the corporation breached
its contract. If a simple corporate breach of contract were enough to impose
liability on the responsible officer under 9 to 5,the 9 to 5 privilege would be
worthless. Without a breach, the privilege would be unnecessary and with a
breach the privilege would not apply. The purpose of the 9 to 5 privilege is not
to protect an officer's actions where no breach has occurred, but to give to
corporations, acting through their officers, the same ability to take legal positions
concerning their contractual rights and duties, and even the same ability to breach
their contracts, as other persons have. Under the Constance interpretation, this
purpose would be frustrated. An officer would be encouraged to sacrifice his
corporation's interests to those of a third party in order to avoid personal
exposure to tort liability. The Constance interpretation of the 9 to 5 privilege
thus seems erroneous and should be rejected.
The second of the narrow privilege cases, Reynolds, poses a more difficult
question than Constance. In Reynolds, the court concluded that the defendant
officer was deliberately and dishonestly "manufacturing reasons" to block a sale
of property that his corporation was contractually obliged to carry out, so that the
same property could be sold to a second buyer at more than twice the first
buyer's price. Reynolds thus posed the question whether the 9 to 5 privilege
would protect even the bad faith conduct of a corporate officer as long as that
conduct was carried out in accordance with the officer's authority, and in the

160.
161.
162.
163.

618 So. 2d 1023 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1025-26.
Id. at 1027.
Id.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

reasonable belief that the conduct was in the best interests of the corporation.
The literal language of 9 to 5 would seem to say yes, yet it is easy to see why
the Reynolds court might have had trouble with that interpretation. The separate
personality of the corporation has never protected corporate officers against
liability for their own personal fraud," and the conduct of the officer in this
case was at least unethical, if not fraudulent.
Reynolds purported to follow 9 to 5, but actually had little in common with
that case. 9 to 5 had posited a tort in which a corporate officer would
deliberately cause his corporation to breach one of its contracts even though the
breach was not in the best interests of the corporation. How such a situation
might actually occur in practice the court did not say,65 but presumably the
interfering officer would be motivated by some personal motive of pecuniary
gain, by unlawful prejudice, or by personal animosity toward the corporate
obligee that was not justified by any legally cognizable' 66 corporate interest. 67 In these types of cases, the 9 to 5 privilege would not apply because the

164. La. R.S. 12:95 (1969); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. American Chem., Inc., 461 So. 2d 1063
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), af'd, 480 So. 2d 730 (1986).
165. Absent some sort of kickback or other self-dealing arrangement, it seems fairly unlikely that
very many corporate officers are going to interfere with their corporation's contracts without thinking
that they have a pretty good corporate reason for doing so. Few officers are going to risk sacrificing
their own careers merely to gain the satisfaction of seeing some corporate obligee suffer. Hence,
unless 9 to 5 was designed, to repeal the business judgment rule (and to call on courts to begin
second-guessing disinterested business decisions by corporate managers), it seems unlikely that very
many situations actually will arise in which the contract-interfering acts of the corporate officer ought
not be considered privileged in the sense required by 9 to 5. But see infra note 167.
166. An officer might have some animosity toward some ethnic group because of an honestlyperceived, but socially-condemned, prejudice about their work ethic or honesty. In the officer's mind,
these might appear to be legitimate corporate interests, but legally they are not likely to be acceptable
as justifications for contract interference.
167. For a collection of cases involving alleged tortious interference by corporate officers or
agents with their own corporations' contracts, see 72 A.L.R. 4th 492 (1989). Most of these cases
involve efforts by fired employees to sue their supervisors for interfering with their contracts of
employment with their companies. Most such efforts are unsuccessful, at least in the reported cases,
but a fair number are not. Several cases have imposed liability (or at least have refused to grant
dismissal or summary judgment for the defendants) where corporate officers have fired employees
for refusing to submit to sexual advances (Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 733 P.2d 430 (Or.
1987); Tash v. Houston, 254 N.W.2d 579 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)), for refusing to commit perjury or
to destroy evidence (Borecki v. Eastern International Management Corp., 694 F. Supp. 47 (D.N.J.
1988); Favors v. Alco Mfg. Co., 367 S.E.2d 328 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); Troy v. Interfinancial, Inc.,
320 S.E.2d 872 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)), for reporting violations of law or company policy to the
appropriate officials (Haupt v. International Harvester Co., 582 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. II1. 1984);
Mailhoit v. Liberty Bank &Trust Co., 510 N.E.2d 773 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)), or even for firing the
employee because of personal animosity or malice, a deteriorated friendship, or for other reasons
considered legally insufficient (Morriss v. Coleman Co., Inc., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987); Presto v.
Sequoia Systems, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Mass. 1986); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial
Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985); Stanfield v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 588 S.W.2d 199
(Mo. Ct. App. 1979); King v. Schaeffer, 154 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. Ct. App.), affd, 155 S.E.2d 815
(1967)).
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law would have no interest in protecting the officer's freedom to make selfinterested decisions that were harmful to a corporate obligee, yet not lawfully
beneficial to the corporate obligor either.
However, the 9 to 5 theory did not fit the facts in Reynolds. It was clear in
Reynolds that the actions of the corporate officer were enormously beneficial
both to the corporation and to the corporate officer, and that the corporate
officer, as 60% shareholder of the company, had the power to authorize himself
to do what he did. It may well be that this type of behavior should be
condemned, but 9 to 5 did not condemn it. 9 to 5 proscribed contract interference that was not authorized or not reasonably thought to be in the best interest
of the corporation, where the corporation's interests truly were separate and
distinct from those of the interfering officer. Reynolds dealt with interference
that was unquestionably authorized 6 ' and undoubtedly beneficial, 69 where

Tortious interference doctrine in the corporate employment context serves as a limitation on the
traditional employment-at-will doctrine, for a corporation can fire a person only through the acts of
its agents. Unless a corporate employer wishes to have its supervisors afraid of firing people, the
employer is going to have to indemnify its supervisors when they are sued for "interfering" with the
fired person's employment contract with the company. And unless the employer wishes to make a
lot of indemnity payments, it is going to have to provide instructions to the supervisors on how to
avoid such suits. As a practical matter, therefore, the tortious interference suits put pressure on
employers and supervisory employees not to exercise the rights that they are supposed to have under
the employment-at-will doctrine, but rather to make employment decisions that can be defended under
the tortious interference "privilege" that is granted to corporate officers and agents. Tortious
interference doctrine thus gives to the corporation, acting through its supervisory agents, the
"privilege" to fire people, not at will, but only to the extent that the firings can be justified as
reasonable business decisions by the agents.
Whether tortious interference doctrine will serve this sort of function in Louisiana is difficult to
say, but it would seem more appropriate to revisit the employment-at-will doctrine openly than to
back into limitations on the doctrine by imposing personal liability on supervisory corporate
employees. But cf. Neel, slip op. 93-CA-1366, 1993 WL 521208 (refusal to allow fired employee
on former employer's property could constitute tortious interference with employee's job with another
employer where the other employer required access to that property).
Outside the employment context, most of the reported decisions are 9 to 5-style cases in which
some corporate obligee has tried, unsuccessfully, to attach personal liability to a corporate officer who
found it in the best interest of the corporation to cause his company to do business with someone
else. Occasionally, however, the plaintiff has won or at least has been successful in avoiding
dismissal or summary judgment for the defendant. See Olympic Fish Prods., Inc. v. Lloyd, 611 P.2d
737 (Wash. 1980) (50% corporate shareholder liable for shifting corporation's sales from one
customer to another to obtain a higher price for the corporation's products); Chanay v. Chittenden,
563 P.2d 287 (Ariz. 1977) (insurance company vice president alleged to have terminated agent's
contract with company so that the vice president could take over his business); McIntosh v. Magna
Sys., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (malicious amendment of corporate articles to eliminate
plaintiff's stock options). Most of these cases, like the Reynolds case discussed in the text, might
be better analyzed under a veil-piercing or personal fraud theory, for the tortious interference theory
is used in these cases to prevent conduct that is beneficial to both the corporation and to the
controlling shareholder(s) of the corporation, something that the 9 to 5-type of privilege is supposed
to allow.
168. Although formal defects might have been found in the majority shareholder's authority (the
opinion does not mention any board resolution authorizing his conduct), these defects would indeed
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the corporation's interests very much coincided with the interests of the corporate
officer.70 The gravamen of the 9 to 5 tort was intentional interference by a
corporate officer with a corporate contract, where the interference was not
justified by some reasonably perceived corporate interest. The gravamen of the
Reynolds tort was dishonest and unethical personal behavior by a controlling
corporate shareholder that was so far beyond the bounds of propriety that it could
not be justified by the mere fiction that it was done for the benefit of someone
else, the dishonest shareholder's own 60%-held company.
Reynolds actually had much more in common with Louisiana's traditional
forms of veil-piercing and personal fraud cases than it did with the tortious
interference analysis used in 9 to 5. Long before 9 to 5 was decided, Louisiana
courts were already imposing personal liability on the shareholders of closelyheld corporations for the type of behavior described in Reynolds.' 7' Reynolds
is better understood as yet another example of these traditional decisions. As a
tortious interference decision, it seemed erroneous. Had the 9 to 5 privilege
actually been respected, Reynolds would have reached the opposite result. As
decided, it appeared to reach the right result for the wrong reason.
2. The Effects of 9 to 5
Read narrowly, 9 to 5 proscribed a type of conduct that is not likely to occur
very often in practice. It is a type of conduct that has yet to be found in any
reported Louisiana decision.'
It seems unlikely that it was concern over this

be strictly formal. There could be no real doubt that the 60% shareholder ultimately had the power
to authorize himself to do exactly what he did (by electing the necessary directors and having them
adopt the appropriate resolution), nor any real doubt that what he did was beneficial to the
corporation.
169. By causing the corporation to breach its contract with the first buyer, and by causing it to
sell its property to the second buyer instead, the corporate officer got for his company more than
double the price that had been promised to it in the first contract.
170. The 9 to 5 corporation was an enormous 200-director nonprofit company that was set up
to operate the 1984 World's Fair in New Orleans. The Reynolds corporation was a relatively small
company, owned 60/40 by just two individuals. In 9 to 5, the collective interests of the World's Fair
participants did not overlap with those of the defendant officer, except to the extent that the officer
would enhance his reputation by doing a good job. In Reynolds, there was a very great overlapping
of interests; the officer would enjoy 60% of any profits made by the company, and would suffer 60%
of any loss, up to the amount of his investment.
171. Terry v. Guillory, 538 So. 2d 317 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Egudin v. Carriage Court
Condominium, Dehrvill Group, Inc., 528 So. 2d 1043 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 532 So. 2d
136 (1988); Lone Star Indus., Inc. v. American Chem., Inc., 461 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1984), afftd, 480 So. 2d 730 (1986); Dolese Concrete Co. v. Tessitore, 357 So. 2d 869 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 359 So. 2d 620, 623 (1978); Smith-Hearron v. Frazier, Inc., 352 So. 2d 263 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1977), writ denied, 353 So. 2d 1337 (1978); Altex Ready-Mixed Concrete Corp. v.
Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 308 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 312 So. 2d
872 (1975).
172. Some courts outside Louisiana have imposed tortious interference liability on corporate
officers under facts similar to those in Reynolds. See Olympic Fish Prods., Inc. v. Lloyd, 611 P.2d
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rather narrow, unlikely type of misconduct that prompted the 9 to 5 decision.
Something more important seemed to be at stake, namely, a fresh start in the
Louisiana jurisprudence concerning tortious interference with contract. The
common law on the subject was not to be adopted whole and undigested, but
neither was the old absolute bar to be used to block all reasoning on the subject.
Starting with the unfortunately peculiar facts of 9 to 5, the supreme court was
going to lift the old absolute bar, and invite further development in the law.
But if 9 to 5 was indeed an invitation to further developments, most lower
courts have declined the invitation. It appears that they were happy enough with
the simplicity and certainty that was provided by the old absolute bar. One judge
has candidly acknowledged that the supreme court probably had something a
little broader in mind in rendering the 9 to 5 decision, but has nevertheless
refused to speculate on what that broader something might have been: "If the
[tortious interference] cause of action is to be expanded [beyond the 9 to 5 type
of case] I consider it to be the Supreme Court's function to do so and not ours
as an intermediate appellate court."' With few exceptions, the federal courts
have been equally cautious. Most have refused to guess what Louisiana law
might be on this subject beyond the narrow confines of 9 to 5 itself."
They

737 (Wash. 1980) (50% corporate shareholder liable for shifting corporation's sales from one
customer to another to obtain ahigher price for the corporation's products). These cases are subject
to the same sort of criticism as Reynolds itself: they use tortious interference analysis where the issue
is more one of veil-piercing or personal fraud.
173. Tallo v. Stroh Brewery Co., 544 So. 2d 452, 455 (La.App. 4th Cir.) (Schott, J.,
concurring),
writ denied, 547 So. 2d 355 (1989). But see Neel, slip. op. 93-CA-1366, 1993 WL 521208 (rejecting
narrow interpretation of 9 to 5).
174. Junior Money Bags, Ltd. v. Segal, 970 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1992) (dictum approving of district
court's unappealed dismissal of tortious interference claim; proper to interpret 9 to 5 restrictively);
American Waste & Pollution Control Co. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 949 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1991)
(interpreting 9 to 5 as applying only to officer's interference with their own corporation's contracts,
and refusing to allow "unfair trade practices" theory as substitute for tortious interference theory;
Jarrell v. Carter, 577 So. 2d 120 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) distinguished); Ingraffia v. NME Hosps.,
Inc., 943 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1991) (rejecting tortious interference claim by radiologist against officers
of hospital corporation because the "extremely limited circumstances" of 9 to 5 did not exist);
Oreman Sales, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 768 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. La. 1991) (no tortious
interference claim stated under Louisiana or New York law); Matrix Essential, Inc. v. Emporium
Drug Mart, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. La. 1991) (9 to 5 applied only to interference by officer
with his own corporation's contract); Nowling v. Aero Servs. Int'l, Inc., 752 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. La.
1990) (9 to 5 interpreted narrowly, did not extend to interference with one's own contract; contractual
obligation of best efforts created no specific contractual or juridical rights with which a third party
could interfere, and directors of contracting corporation were entitled to cause corporation not to deal
with plaintiff); Union Say. Am. Life Ins. Co v. North Cent. Life Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. 481 (S.D.
Miss. 1993) (narrow interpretation, rejecting claim); MedX, Inc. v. Ranger, 1993 WL 21250 (E.D.
La. 1993) (same); l'nternational Marine & Indus. Applicators, Inc. v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 1992 WL
193550 (E.D. La. 1992) (same); Powers v. Carlisle Corp., 1992 WL 165636 (E.D. La. 1992) (same);
Radiophone, Inc. v. Pricellular Corp., 1992 WL 124389 (E.D. La. 1992) (same); Walle v. Polymer
Devel. Lab., Inc., 1991 WL 195492 (E.D. La. 1991) (same); SMP Sales Management, Inc. v. Fleet
Credit Corp., 1991 WL 349564 (W.D. La. 1991) (same), affld, 960 So. 2d 557 (5th Cir. 1992)
(affirmed on prescription grounds, but also approving of dismissal on merits); Popeyes, Inc. v.
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are taking the 9 to 5 decision literally, and they are declining to take any further
steps in the tortious interference field without first acquiring some more guidance
from the supreme court.1 75 The old absolute bar against tortious interference
suits thus stands virtually intact in nearly all the cases in which it is relevant.
It is difficult to say at this point that 9 to 5 was a landmark case. So far,
the decision has succeeded only in producing a large number of new appellate
decisions that say tortious interference suits are almost never to be recognized
in Louisiana. The real impact of 9 to 5 seems to be the encouragement it has
provided to litigants to include tortious interference claims in the suits that they
file. This renewed attention may eventually produce a case that allows the
supreme court to endorse a broader, more useful version of tortious interference
theory than the one approved in 9 to 5 itself. If so, then 9 to 5 will have made
an important impact on the development of the law. It may still not merit
attention as a landmark in its own right, but at the very least it will have to be
recognized as the case that made the landmark decision possible.
VII. CONCLUSION

Corporate veil-piercing gets the lion's share of the attention in writings that
discuss the personal liability of corporate investors and managers, but veil
piercing is not the theory that produces the lion's share of liability. Most of the
liability that is reported in the jurisprudence arises out of the personal behavior
of a corporation's active shareholders and officers, and not out of a disregard of
the corporation's separate personality.
The separate personality of a corporation is important only in protecting a
shareholder against the liability that would otherwise arise out of the
shareholder's status as an owner of the business. If ownership alone is not the
source of the shareholder's liability, then the separate personality theory has little
application. The separate personality of a corporation can no more protect a
shareholder against liability for the shareholder's own personal conduct than can
the separate existence of his mother, spouse, or neighbor. If the shareholder
personally commits a tort or personally signs a contract without disclosing his
agency, he becomes personally liable without regard to whether some other
person, either his corporation or his neighbor, happens to exist.
The main source of the "limited liability"1 76 of corporate officers, agents,
and employees, is not corporation, but agency law. If its rules are followed

YCALWB, Inc., 1989 WL 145979 (E.D. La. 1989) (claim rejected).
But see Huggs, Inc. v. LPC Energy, Inc., 889 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1989) (holder of overriding
interest in mineral lease could recover in tort law for negligence of operator in losing the lease, even
though royalty owner was not in privity of contract with the operator); Eastover Corp. v. Rhodes,
1992 WL 245568 (E.D. La. 1992) (denying motion to dismiss tortious interference claim, even
though facts alleged were outside those described in 9 to 5).
175. Id.
176. Actually, the liability is not limited; it simply does not exist, period.
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properly, agency law does permit one person to engage in juridical acts in the
name and on behalf of another (regardless of whether this other person is a
human being or a corporation) and to avoid personal responsibility for those acts.
Personal exposure arises when the agent has violated some rule of agency law
(or has personally guaranteed the obligation) or when the liability in question
does not arise merely from the juridical act of the principal. If the agent has
committed a tort personally, then absent some special form of immunity, the
agent will be personally liable for the resulting damages. Agency law does not
provide some broad grant of tort immunity to agents, nor otherwise protect them
from personal liability for their own tortious conduct.
The most difficult cases to decide are those in which an agent is said to owe
some sort of tort duty to cause his principal to perform the juridical obligations
that agency law would say are not binding on the agent. A few cases, confusing
contract and tort law, have indeed imposed a form of tort obligation on an agent
to see to it that his principal performs its contracts. The supreme court has
recognized a narrow version of this sort of duty-the duty of a corporate officer
not to interfere intentionally and unjustifiably with the contracts of his
corporation-but in recognizing this narrow duty has seemed also to overrule the
earlier, broader line of "tortious breach" cases. Under the more recent supreme
court guidance, a corporate officer is not to be held liable for his corporate
principal's failure to perform its contract unless the officer has intentionally and
unjustifiably interfered with the corporation's efforts to perform.
Although much is written on the subject, corporate veil-piercing explains
only part of the cases in which a corporate participant is held personally liable
in connection with his corporation-related activities. Conversely, the recognition
'of a separate corporate personality explains only part of the cases in which active
corporate participants are protected from liability. This article was written as a
follow-up to an earlier veil-piercing discussion' 77 in an effort to help complete
the picture.

177.

Morris, supra note I.
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